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WARTIME EXPERIENCE IN JOINT AND COMBINED-ARMS OPERATIONS

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[Article, published under the heading "The Great Patriotic War" and the subheading "Operational Art," by Merited RSFSR Scientist, Professor, Doctor of Military Science Lt Gen V. Reznichenko, and Docent and Candidate of Military Sciences Col I. Suddenok: "The System of Combined-Arms and Joint Operations"]

[Text] In wars of the past, the system of operations implied by the overall strategic plan of the state's military leadership predetermined the content of war campaigns. Back in the mid-19th century, Engels noted: "A campaign is a series of military operations, closely associated with each other by a single strategic plan and directed at achieving one strategic goal...."* Defeat of the main enemy groupings and attainment of goals in the campaigns of the Great Patriotic War were also founded on a system of combined-arms and joint offensive and defensive operations.

This article attempts to reveal the system of combined-arms and joint offensive operations by combined ground, air, and naval forces, and describe the basic directions of improving the preparations for and the conduct of such operations, on the basis of the campaigns in the second and third periods of the Great Patriotic War. Because this is in fact the first time this problem has been tackled in the literature of military history, the authors do not claim to have made a full investigation of the subject.

I

An analysis of the planning and conduct of combat activities by Soviet troops and forces would show that the content of campaigns in all of the war's periods was determined on the basis of a purposeful system of operations, varying in scope and conducted for various purposes by field forces dominated by one of the armed services or branches of troops.

An example of such a system of operation, is that developed by the Supreme Command Headquarters for the 1942-1943 winter campaign following meticulous and comprehensive

*Marks, K., and Engel's, F., "Soch." [Works], Vol 14, p 242.

assessment of the military-political situation, the enemy troop grouping and defenses, his capabilities, and the capabilities of our troops. In order to defeat the strongest enemy groupings, seize the strategic initiative and achieve a decisive turning point in the armed conflict, the Supreme Command planned to destroy the enemy grouping located between the Volga and the Don, and then to make thrusts toward the North Caucasus, the upper reaches of the Don, and in the vicinities of Leningrad, Velikiye Luki, Rzhev, and Vyaz'ma. This was to be followed by development of an offensive in the Kursk and Khar'kov sectors and in the Donetsk Basin.* The following actions were conducted during this campaign: a counteroffensive at Stalingrad, penetration of the Leningrad blockade, an operation to liberate the North Caucasus, the Ostrogozhsk-Rossoshanskiy and Voronezh-Kastornoye operations, the Khar'kov offensive operation of 1943, an operation to wipe out the Demyansk bridgehead, and others.

Thus systems of operations predetermined the content of the campaigns of the Great Patriotic War; they were sets of successive operations by field forces and formations of different armed services and branches of troops, closely related by an overall strategic plan and directed at strategic, operational-strategic, and operational objectives. Combined-arms and joint offensive and defensive operations played the leading role in these systems.

Combined-arms operations were prepared for and conducted with the participation of all or most of the armed services, branches of troops, and special troops, under the leadership of a combined-arms command. During them, several mutually associated but different strategic and operational missions were executed simultaneously, in an integrated fashion. They were subdivided into strategic operations by groups of fronts, and frontal and army operations. Thus strategic operations by groups of fronts, in which ground, air, and naval forces participated, included: the offensive operation at Leningrad and Novgorod, and the Iasi-Kishinev operation (1944), and the East Prussian and Berlin operations (1945). Frontal operations included the Petsamo-Kirkenes operation (1944) and others. An example of an army operation is that conducted by the Maritime Army during the Crimean operation of 1944.

Joint operations, being an inherent part of combined-arms operations, were prepared for and conducted by the field forces and formations of several armed services, branches of troops, and special troops. They pursued operational-strategic or operational objectives of predominantly the same kind, under the leadership of a combined-arms command or the command of that armed service which played the decisive role in the given operation. Examples are the offensive operations of the 3d Ukrainian Front in the Iasi-Kishinev operation, that of the 3d Belorussian Front in the Eastern Prussian operation, that of the 2d Belorussian Front in the Berlin operation, that of the 1st Far East Front in the Manchurian strategic offensive operation, and others. Major formations of other armed services often conducted independent operations within the former.

During the Great Patriotic War the overwhelming majority of the strategic operations were conducted by troops of frontal groups (consisting of two or three, and sometimes four fronts), with the assistance of major formations from the air

*See "Istoriya vtoroy mirovoy voyny 1939-1945" [History of World War II 1939-1945], Vol 6, Voenizdat, 1976, p 26.

force and the National Air Defense Forces and, in maritime sectors, the navy. In a number of cases strategic missions were pursued through the efforts of just one front (the L'vov-Sandomierz operation of the 1st Ukrainian Front, and the Petsamo-Kirkenes operation of the Karelian Front in 1944, and so on).

Offensive operations conducted by groups of fronts were systems of frontal offensive operations that were coordinated in relation to goals, missions, place, and time, and which were conducted in accordance with the overall plan of the Supreme Command Headquarters. They were conducted with the goal of defeating large strategic enemy groupings and capturing the most important areas (lines). In the first period of the war, some of the strategic operations of groups of fronts--such as the Iasi-Kishinev operation and the operation to liberate Hungary--were aimed at knocking individual countries in the fascist bloc (Romania and Hungary) out of the war.

The first time groups of fronts prepared for and conducted complete strategic offensive operations was in the counteroffensive at Moscow and Stalingrad. From that time on, the system of major offensive operations conducted by groups of fronts engaged in a strategic offensive became a regular feature of combat in the Great Patriotic War.

Frontal offensive operations are essentially systems of operations, engagements, battles, thrusts, and maneuvers, coordinated in relation to goals, missions, place, and time and conducted according to a single plan by frontal troops in coordination with field forces and formations of the air force, the National Air Defense Forces and, in maritime sectors, the navy. They were prepared with the goal of destroying opposing enemy groupings and capturing enemy territory in a particular strategic or operational sector. In most cases such operations were an inherent part of strategic operations, during which the fronts pursued major operational objectives.

As a rule fronts participating in strategic operations performed a number of successive joint operations. Thus in the liberation of Belorussia in 1944, the 3d Belorussian Front participated first in the Vitebsk-Orsha operation together with the 1st Baltic Front, and then in the Minsk operation together with the 2d and 1st Belorussian fronts.

The role of frontal operations in strategic operations was not always the same. Some were conducted in the main sectors, and the troops in these sectors performed the most important missions while others in secondary sectors provided support to successful completion of these missions. Thus for example, in the first phase of the Belorussian offensive operation the 3d and 1st Belorussian fronts played the main role. They penetrated enemy defenses on the flanks of the Belorussian salient, exploited the offensive in depth, and attained the rear of the main forces of Army Group Center. Part of the forces of the 1st Baltic Front supported the strike grouping of the 3d Belorussian Front from the north, while the 2d Belorussian Front contained the enemy's 4th Field Army by aggressive actions from the front.

In the overwhelming majority of strategic operations, fronts intended to conduct an offensive were deployed in the assault echelon, and it was only in the battles of Moscow and Kursk that the Supreme Command Headquarters possessed reserves of frontal strength (correspondingly the Reserve and Steppe fronts).

Army offensive operations were a system of encounters, engagements, thrusts, and maneuvers, coordinated in relation to goals, missions, place and time, and conducted by formations of a combined-arms (tank) army according to a single concept and plan, in interaction with frontal aviation, with formations and units of other frontal armed services and branches of troops and, in maritime sectors, with naval forces. Their goal was to defeat the opposing enemy grouping and capture its territory within a single operational sector.

The offensive operations of combined-arms armies were usually components of frontal operations, in which they pursued operational objectives in interaction with other armies making up the main frontal troop grouping and being the principal resource for achieving the goals of frontal operations. In this case armies which played the main role in the initiation of frontal operations could be switched to action in secondary sectors, and vice versa. Thus the 6th Guards Army, 1st Baltic Front, which attacked in the main sector at the beginning of the Vitebsk-Polotsk operation, was subsequently regrouped in the Dvina sector in the vicinity of Daugavpils to cover the front's right flank. The Central Front's 60th Army (in the liberation of the left-bank Ukraine in August-October 1943) was to assist, with some of its forces, the offensive of the 65th Army, a component of the front's main grouping, at the beginning of the operation. However, because of the successfulness of the offensive within the 60th Army's zone, the frontal command decided to regroup the front's main forces there immediately.*

Combined-arms armies conducted two or three successive army operations in depth in the course of frontal offensive operations.

Tank armies conducted offensive operations in coordination with the combined-arms armies of a front. In this case the tank armies as a rule took part in the front's main missions in the most important sectors. In some operations they deployed in the assault echelon and operated first with combined-arms armies (the 6th Tank Army in the Korsun'-Shevchenko operation and the 6th Guards Tank Army in the Debrecen and Manchurian operations) with the goal of penetrating tactical defenses, and at operational depth they exploited the offensive apart from the main forces.

In most cases the frontal air armies participated in joint operations with major formations of the ground troops, and in their behalf; they concentrated their main efforts on annihilating enemy troops and equipment on the battlefield, covering frontal troops and rear services from enemy air strikes, and conducting air reconnaissance. Thus during the Orel offensive operation of 1943, frontal and long-range aviation annihilated more than 1,400 airplanes within the zones of advance of the Western, Bryansk and Central fronts, attaining air supremacy.**

In addition to supporting the ground troops and fighting enemy aviation, the air armies provided significant assistance by ferrying ammunition and fuel, especially for tank formations.

Joint operations conducted by the fleets together with Soviet Army troops in maritime sectors were an important form of their combat activities. In a strategic

*"Istoriya vtoroy mirovoy voyny 1939-1945", Vol 7, p 198.

**"Sovetskiye Voenno-Vozdushnyye Sily v Velikoy Otechestvennoy voyne" [The Soviet Air Force in the Great Patriotic War], Voenizdat, 1968, p 194.

offensive waged by ground troop formations, naval forces assisted in the defeat of the enemy's maritime groupings, prevented the supply and evacuation of enemy troops by sea, landed marine assault parties, supported friendly shipping, and created favorable conditions for the swift advance of our troops in maritime offensive zones. Frontal troops liberated the Arctic, the Baltic regions, and the Black Sea coast jointly with forces of the North, Baltic, and Black Sea fleets. Later on, the offensive in the maritime sectors assisted the advance of the Soviet troops into northern Norway, Finland, Poland, Romania, Bulgaria, East Prussia and Pomerania. The Pacific Fleet and Amur Flotilla actively assisted troops of the 1st and 2d Far East fronts in the defeat of the Kwantung Army.

Marine assault landing operations were an active form of joint actions of the navy and ground troop formations, especially in the second and third periods of the war. In most cases marine assault landing operations provided significant assistance to troops in their penetration of enemy defenses and exploitation of the offensive along the coast. The largest assault landing operations of the second and third periods of the war were the Kerch'-El'tingen operation in October-December 1943, the Monsoon operation in September-November 1944 and a number of others.

II

During the Great Patriotic War the art of preparing and conducting combined-arms and joint offensive operations was continually developed and improved. This was assisted by growth in the economic capabilities and by the improvements in the equipment possessed by formations and by operational field forces, improvements in their organization, creative utilization of the war experience by commands and staffs at all levels, growth in the morale of the Soviet troops, swift development of strategy, operational art and tactics, and change in the nature and means of the enemy's military activities.

Thrusts on one or both flanks coupled with exploitation of the offensive on converging axes with the goal of encircling and annihilating enemy groupings became the most widespread form of frontal offensive (Ostrogozhsk-Rossosh', Bobruysk and other operations).

But whenever the situation would not permit encirclement operations, the fronts made one or two deep frontal thrusts, splitting the enemy grouping and annihilating it in parts (the 1st Belorussian Front in the Vistula-Oder operation). As a rule the armies made one thrust in the center or on one of the flanks, exploited the offensive in depth or toward a flank, and surrounded the enemy, interacting with armies of the same or neighboring front. It should be emphasized that beginning with the second period of the war, encirclement operations were conducted with increasing frequency, while less and less time was spent on liquidating encircled enemy groupings (2.5 months in the Stalingrad operation, 7-8 days in the Iasi-Kishinev operation, and 8-9 days in the Berlin operation). This was achieved through simultaneous creation of an inner and an outer front of encirclement, and through merger of efforts to encircle, divide, and annihilate the enemy into a single process, coupled with simultaneous blockade of encircled groupings from land, air, and sea.

The direction of the main thrust was chosen in such a way as to penetrate the defenses in the most vulnerable, weakest place, and permit the strike grouping to reach the flank and rear of the enemy's main forces. However, the situation sometimes necessitated application of the main thrust against strong enemy defenses (the Voronezh and Steppe fronts in the Belgorod-Khar'kov operation, the 11th Guards and 3d armies in the Belorussian operation; in offensives waged from bridgeheads--the 13th, 52d, and 3d Guards armies of the 1st Ukrainian Front in the Vistula-Oder operation, the 3d and 5th Strike and 8th Guards armies of the 1st Belorussian Front in the Berlin operation, and others). When sufficient numbers of men and equipment were present, in addition to a main thrust the fronts made a second, less-powerful thrust as well as one or two auxiliary thrusts (the 1st Belorussian Front in the Vistula-Oder operation).

The most important principle of supporting a breakthrough and exploitation of an offensive by field forces was increasingly more decisive massing of men and equipment in the directions of the main thrusts, and creation of a high troop density. In the second and especially in the third periods of the war from 45 to 70 percent of the rifle troops, up to 70 percent of the artillery and up to 60-90 percent of the tanks and aviation were concentrated in breakthrough sectors representing 7-16 percent of the total width of the front's zone of advance.* Armies attacking in the direction of the front's main thrust penetrated defenses within a 6-14 km sector. In a number of cases the width of the breakthrough sector and the zone of advance coincided. In comparison with the first period of the war, in the third period the operational-tactical density in breakthrough sectors increased by 3-10 times for artillery and 5-10 times for tanks.

As enemy defenses became stronger and as the order of battle of the field forces grew larger, the depth of their operational disposition increased. While in the first period of the war the frontal order of battle consisted of combined-arms armies, the front's air forces and weak reserves, in the second period stronger assault echelons began to be created, while in the third, beginning with summer 1944 back-up echelons consisting of one army began to be formed; starting with the operations of 1945, these back-up echelons contained one or two armies and mobile groups consisting of one to three tank armies (one or two corps or one or two mechanized cavalry groups), antiaircraft artillery groups, artillery-antitank reserves and mobile obstacle construction detachments. As a result the total depth of the operational disposition of fronts attained 70-100 km while that of armies reached 30 km, which was enough to support a powerful, swift thrust when penetrating enemy defenses and exploiting the offensive in depth.

As the fighting capabilities of the field forces grew and as breakthrough tactics improved (actions by strike groupings, transition to artillery and air offensives, and so on), our troops gained the capability for penetrating the main defense zone within the first day of the offensive, and the second defense zone within the second day.

Operational pursuit usually began following penetration of the tactical defense zone, or during intentional withdrawal of enemy troops, and it was waged on a broad

*"Voyennoye iskusstvo vo vtoroy mirovoy voyne" [The Art of War in World War II], Moscow, Izd-vo Voennoy akademii General'nogo shtaba, 1973, p 300.

front, continuously during the day and night, in individual sectors, and at a high pace (20-30 km per day for rifle formations, and 40-60 and more km per day for tank and mechanized formations). Experience showed that parallel and combined pursuit were the most effective.

The means for maneuvering men and equipment improved constantly through the war. Maneuver was employed to achieve decisive results primarily in the direction of the main thrust. This was usually made possible owing to well-organized and prompt commitment of mobile frontal and army groups to an encounter. But if success in a selected direction seemed impossible during an operation and another direction did promise success, the commanders of operational formations boldly maneuvered their men and equipment, and exploited the offensive in a new direction (maneuver of the Bryansk Front into the zone of the Western Front in September 1943, maneuver, in the direction of promising success, of the 51st Army in the Melitopol' operation, the 5th Guards Tank Army in the Belorussian operation and the 11th Guards Army in the East Prussian operation). In some operations several variants of ways to commit mobile frontal groups to an encounter were planned beforehand (the 3d Belorussian Front in the Belorussian operation). In a number of cases maneuver was tied in together with major troop regroupings involving considerable distances (the liberation of the Baltic in fall 1944, and the Berlin operation). Covertiness and a high march pace promoted attainment of surprise in the appearance of major forces in new sectors.

Successive operations conducted by fronts and armies both in front and in depth became a new phenomenon in the system of preparation and conduct of combined-arms and joint offensive operations. These operations were unique in that as a rule they were prepared in the course of previous operations and they were intended to begin immediately after conclusion of the former, or following a negligible pause, enough to regroup the troops and replenish reserves.

The scope of frontal and army offensive operations changed as well. The breadth of the zones of advance of fronts and armies decreased by an average of two times during the war, while breakthrough sectors decreased by an average of two or three times. The depth of operations increased significantly. In the third period of the war frontal operations involved a depth of up to 250-300 km, sometimes reaching 500-600 km; army operations had a depth of 50-180 km. In 1944-1945 the rate of advance increased to 20-30 km per day for rifle troops and 50-60 km per day for tank troops. The duration of frontal operations was 15-20 (sometimes 8-12) days, while that of army operations was 5-15 days.*

Control and coordination in preparation and conduct of offensive operations underwent improvement. Centralization increased, though concurrently the subordinated commands and staffs were allowed extensive initiative in the course of combat activities. The command posts were brought closer to the troops (frontal command posts were located 25-30 km from the front line, while army command posts were located 8-12 km away), and direct personal communication with subordinates was intensified. Radio became the main means of command and control at all levels. Coordination between elements of an operational formation and with neighbors was achieved through coordination of the missions and the means of their execution in relation to different stages (or days), lines, time, and objectives, and through reconnaissance, staff

*"Operatsii Sovetskikh Vooruzhennykh Sil v Velikoy Otechestvennoy voyne 1941-1945" [Operations of the Soviet Armed Forces in the Great Patriotic War 1941-1945], Vol 4, Voenizdat, 1959, p 813.

exercises, and war games, on the background of the situation that may be encountered within a particular operation, and with consideration for the forthcoming missions.

Thus during the second and third periods of the war the theory of frontal and army combined-arms and joint offensive operations developed along the lines of improving the methods of their preparation and conduct, improvement of the methods of troop command and control, and so on.

The techniques of preparing and conducting joint operations by major air force formations, mainly in regard to supporting frontal offensive operations, developed quickly during the war. The combat activities of aviation were planned on the basis of the decisions of the frontal commander and the air army commander.

In the first period of the war the air force's combat activities over the battlefield boiled down in most cases to short-term air preparation for an attack, after which it essentially terminated its influence upon the enemy, or limited itself to sporadic thrusts against him with small groups.

Beginning with the second period of the war the air offensive became the main form of support to offensive operations of ground troop field forces by the air force. An air offensive essentially involved air preparation for an attack and continuous support of the troops through massed strikes by aviation throughout the entire depth of an operation.

The air offensive required an increase in the order of battle of air armies, and massed use of aviation in the directions of the main thrusts of the fronts. The order of battle was increased by maneuvering air reserves. Thus for example, air armies taking part in the counteroffensive at Stalingrad were reinforced by four air corps from the Supreme Command's reserve; the Supreme Command Headquarters allocated 18 air corps out of its reserves to reinforce the air grouping involved in preparation and conduct of the battle of Kursk. Decisive massing of aviation was a persistent feature of all subsequent operations of the Great Patriotic War.

The air offensive underwent change during the war. The volume of the missions broadened, and the methods of the offensive improved. Prior to 1943 the combat activities of the air force were limited in air preparation to concentrated thrusts by units of regimental and divisional size. Massed strikes, in which several air divisions participated, came into broad use during the joint offensive operations of 1943-1945. Immediate air preparation in the second and third periods of the war was conducted not only prior to the start but also in the course of an operation--prior to commitment of tank armies or the back-up echelons of the fronts to the encounter, and during penetration of the enemy's intermediate defensive lines at operational depth.

Commitment of a tank army to an encounter was supported by the main forces of an air army. The cover it provided with fighter aviation was intensified, and enemy airfields were blockaded and struck at this time. In the Orel, Belgorod-Khar'kov, L'vov-Sandomierz and other operations, air preparation was conducted prior to commitment of tank armies to an encounter, while an offensive conducted at operational depth was supported continuously by ground-attack and fighter units.

Consequently improvements in the art of preparing and conducting joint air force operations proceeded along a complex path: from dispersal of aviation over a broad front to its concentration in the directions of the main thrusts by ground troops, from sporadic and short-term influence upon the enemy by small forces to continuous support involving massed use of air formations and field forces in behalf of the most important missions, and from periodic sorties to the air offensive.

Joint operations conducted by naval task forces and the ground troops were the main form of combat formations of naval task forces. Their missions depended on the concrete situation and the requirements of Soviet strategy, which foresaw unification of the efforts of all armed services to achieve common strategic and operational ends.

Coordination between naval forces and the field forces of the ground troops improved continuously during the war. The organization of naval command and control was worked out, preparations for their actions were improved, and comprehensive support to these actions was strengthened. Thus while in 1943 preparation of naval forces basically involved planning the landing of marine assault parties and military shipments in behalf of a front, in 1944-1945 fleet and front staffs jointly planned the actions of frontal troops and naval forces in an operation.

The experience of frontal offensive operations in maritime sectors was used as a basis for developing the clear sequence of actions of naval forces: They supported sea transfers having the goal of reinforcing task forces; they actively interdicted enemy lines of communication, and they made massed strikes against enemy aviation and ships. When ground troops went over to the offensive, special naval groupings participated in artillery and air preparation of the breakthrough of the tactical defense zone, and in support of offensives waged along a coast. During exploitation of such an offensive at operational depth, they continued to provide air and artillery support; they covered the troops against strikes from the sea, and they cooperated with the latter in maintaining defenses against enemy assault landings.

Marine assault landings enjoyed significant development during the war. Evidence of this can be found in the fact that more than 80 percent of all assault landings were successful.* The most instructive aspects in the use of marine assault landing parties were: close interaction with ground troops in maritime sectors, preparation of assault landing parties in short time and without the enemy's awareness, surprise in landing, and diversity in the means for penetrating enemy defenses on shore.

* * *

In the second and third periods of the Great Patriotic War the experience of preparing and conducting combined-arms and joint offensive operations was enriched by a number of new premises. An analysis of these premises would reveal the following trends in development of this important subdivision of Soviet art of war.

*"Voyennoye iskusstvo vo vtoroy mirovoy voyne" [The Art of War in World War II], p 457.

1. The dominant trend was growth in the number of combined-arms and joint operations of various scale, conducted with the participation of field forces (formations) of all armed services. The order of battle of the field forces grew in size, and the role played by the men and equipment of different branches of troops and armed services in offensive operations increased. Growth in the role of combined-arms and joint operations was the product of an objective law: Success could be achieved in an encounter only through the combined efforts of all forces and resources of armed conflict .

2. The forms of operations became increasingly more diverse in the course of the war. The most typical were: encirclement and annihilation of large enemy groupings, fragmentation of the front of enemy defenses, and division of the opposing enemy grouping followed by its annihilation in parts. This was promoted by the tendency for continually increasing the depth of the operational disposition of troops in frontal and army offensive operations, and creation of new, more-mobile elements (mobile groups, airborne groupings), which made it possible to shift the focus of combat actions in depth faster, break troop groupings into fragments, undermine their capability for resistance, disturb control and disorganize rear services and logistics.

3. The development of the methods for defeating the enemy by fire included growth in the extent of fire preparation prior to an attack--especially in relation to anti-tank defenses, coordinated, integrated use of artillery and aviation in support of fire missions, continuity of fire support throughout the entire depth of an offensive, and diversity in the methods of executing fire missions.

4. A tendency toward mutual penetration of armed forces into the spheres of action of each other was manifested in the Great Patriotic War. This was an indication of growth in the unity of the actions of the army and navy. Thus for example, the mission of achieving supremacy at sea was executed not only through the efforts of the fleets but also through a system of measures implemented by the ground troops and the air force. On the other hand the intensiveness of the struggle in land theaters of war predetermined utilization of the air force and navy in behalf of frontal and army operations.

The deep organic mutual relationship existing in the forms and methods of armed struggle by field forces belonging to different armed services in different areas was a product of historic development, and it is now an objective law of success in joint offensive operations. There can be no doubt that the unique features of the armed forces and the particular ways in which they conduct military activities on land, at sea and in the air are still significant today. What is most important is to find the most suitable forms and methods of action and the most effective uses of men and equipment in encounters and engagements in each concrete situation.

Such are the basic directions in the development of the art of preparing and conducting combined-arms and joint offensive operations in the Great Patriotic War. This experience is still significant today, but it must be utilized with a consideration for the new trends and the new level of development of armament and equipment, as well as changes in the enemy's viewpoints on organizing and conducting combat activities.

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WARTIME ORGANIZATIONAL DEVELOPMENT OF SIGNAL TROOPS

Moscow VOYENNO-ISTORICHESKIY ZHURNAL in Russian No 4, Apr 81 (signed to press 20 Feb 81) pp 20-27

[Article, published under the heading "The Great Patriotic War" and the subheading "Operational Art," by Maj Gen Signal Trps V. Sokolov: "Development of the Organizational Structure of Signal Troops in the War Years"]

[Text] The experience of the Great Patriotic War has persuasively demonstrated that without stable communication, continuous control of the troops cannot be achieved. The signal troops played the main role in supporting command and control. Their organizational structure, equipment, and principles of combat application constantly improved during the war.

At the beginning of the war the signal troops consisted of signal troop units and subunits, as well as of district and army units and subunits.

Signal troop units and subunits were organizationally within the composition of formations and units of the branches of troops and armed services. The organizational tables of rifle and mechanized corps and of rifle divisions included separate signal battalions, those of rifle regiments included signal companies, and those of rifle battalions included signal platoons. The plans called for increasing the number of personnel and the quantity of materiel in the event of war. But no significant organizational changes were foreseen.

The districts and armies were to possess signal units¹ intended to provide communication between frontal and army staffs and General Staff, between each other, and with the staffs of the formations and neighbors in the event of war. Thus according to the operational concept, the front was to possess the following separate units: a signal regiment, four line signal battalions, three telegraph operations companies, eight telegraph line construction companies, five line-construction companies, a storage depot, and a communications workshop. Armies were to have a separate signal regiment, four telegraph line construction companies, two telegraph operations companies, six line-construction companies, a storage depot, and a communications workshop.

Separate signal units subordinated to frontal and army staffs could provide support to reliable and flexible troop command and control in the event of their deployment at wartime strength. As an example using the men and equipment of a radio company, an army separate signal regiment supported radio communication with the General Staff,

the frontal staff, and the staffs of formations and neighboring field forces by means of radio links and radio networks. Its telegraph-telephone and line signal battalions provided telegraph and telephone communication to the army staff and to all staffs and organs of its field control services. The separate signal battalion could set up an army staff's center line and support its line operations on its own. Separate line-construction companies and telegraph line construction companies were intended to build center communication lines and individual communication links. In the course of a 10-hour work day, each of them could build an 80-90 kilometer line. A separate telegraph operations company had the capability for servicing a section of wire communication lines up to 150 km long.

To support this, here are two examples from the experience of supporting radio and wire communications of the headquarters of the 9th Army, Southern Front in July and August 1941.

As of 10 July 1941 Major General of Signal Troops A. M. Strelkov, field forces signal chief, possessed a separate signal regiment, two line signal battalions, five line-construction companies, three telegraph line construction companies, and three telegraph operations companies. This meant that the regiment's own forces could simultaneously set up a communications center for the army staff and two communications centers in the vicinities of back-up command posts. The latter were also to be serviced by auxiliary communication centers (VUS's) and control and testing points (KIP's). Line signal units were used to restore and protect existing permanent lines and build lateral lines, necessary for creation of detouring communication links. Line communication with neighbors was provided by several detour links passing through newly created VUS's and KIP's.

In August 1941 the staff of the 9th Army maintained radio communication with the General Staff by a radio link and with the staff of the Southern Front by the front's radio network. Two radio networks were created for communication with formation staffs. Communication with the 51st Rifle Division on the right flank was also maintained by way of a radio link. A radio coordination network was created only to provide communication with the fortified region of the Black Sea Fleet, the Dniepr Naval Flotilla, and the separate garrison at Golaya Pristan'.

These examples show that possession, by frontal and army staffs, of the outfit of signal units required for combat is a guarantee of successful organization of radio and wire communication at the frontal and army levels. However, deployment of frontal and army signal units in the western frontier military districts was foiled by the sudden onset of war. The insufficient number of frontal and army signal units and the total absence of centrally subordinated signal units placed the higher staffs of the Red Army in a difficult position at the beginning of the war. According to our prewar viewpoints the General Staff was to communicate with fronts and armies through the state communication network. For these purposes the Red Army Communications Directorate rented communication lines and communication channels from the People's Commissariat of Communications.

However, within the very first weeks of the war it became clear that the plans for using only the forces and resources of the Peoples Commissariat of Communications were unfounded. The demands of controlling frontal and army troops, especially in frontier regions of the Soviet Union in 1939-1940, could not be fully satisfied.

The situation had to be corrected in the difficult conditions of combat activities. The Communist Party and Soviet government took a number of emergency steps aimed at improving the work of state and military communications. Significance was attached in this case to improving organizational structure, including that of the executive communications organs of the Red Army, which were faced by the complex and important tasks of ensuring uninterrupted control of frontal and army staffs by the General Staff.

The following contributed to the General Staff's communications at the beginning of the war: the Red Army Communications Directorate (USKA), the Operations Directorate of the General Staff, and the People's Commissariat of Communications, which were not subordinated to one another. Concurrently with them, communications detachments operated independently for some time in the Main Directorate of the Air Force, the Red Army Antiaircraft Troops, and elsewhere. Such decentralization of leadership hindered effective use of the available men and equipment. Therefore the State Defense Committee decided in July 1941 to unify the leadership of state and military communications. The signal chief of the Red Army became the concurrent USSR people's commissar of communications. Colonel (subsequently Marshal of Signal Troops) I. T. Peresyarkin was appointed to this post. This action wiped out the bureaucratic barriers. In August 1941 the Red Army Communications Directorate was reorganized as the Red Army Main Directorate of Communications (GUSKA), and I. T. Peresyarkin (being the GUSKA chief) was appointed deputy people's defense commissar for communications. These steps promoted a sharp increase in the authority of the supreme executive organ of the signal troops.

The Red Army Main Directorate for Communications was given the mission of supporting communication of the Supreme Command Headquarters and the General Staff with the troops. It was also to establish the main principles and methods of organizing communication to support interaction between different armed services, branches of troops, fronts, and armies. It should be noted that the organizational structure of the GUSKA was restructured during the war as the forms and methods of the armed conflict and the means of organizing troop command and control changed, and as the equipment available to the latter increased. Thus growth in the scale of offensive operations beginning with the second period of the Great Patriotic War, the great distances separating the frontal and army staffs from General Staff, and frequent movements of their control posts made it necessary to enlarge the manning of the GUSKA by adding the positions of communication link chiefs, who were given the responsibility of organizing and maintaining stable communications with a front or a group of fronts operating within a single strategic sector. From the first days of the war the party Central Committee, the Soviet government and the General Staff focused their attention on forming new central, frontal, and army signal units and subunits.

As of 1 December 1941 the People's Commissariat for Communications formed six repair and operations battalions, a signal train, 37 telegraph-telephone and 35 telegraph operations companies, eight construction columns, six signal detachments, and 135 military operations communication centers. In turn, the People's Commissariat of Defense created separate repair and restoration, telegraph-telephone, and line signal battalions, as well as radio battalions and telegraph operations and line-construction companies. All of these units, which subsequently became signal units of the Supreme Command's reserve, were intended to create back-up

communication centers, and to build and restore main and lateral lines in behalf of national communications and communications of the General Staff, the fronts, and the armies.

Besides centrally subordinated signal units, frontal and army signal units enjoyed extensive development. Thus by as early as July 1941 five separate signal regiments, 33 line battalions and 26 signal companies intended for various purposes were formed to support the communication needs of the staffs of the northwestern, western, and southwestern strategic sectors. As of 20 August 1941 the fronts and armies were up to 60-70 percent of their strength in separate signal regiments and up to 80-90 percent in separate line signal battalions.² In all during the first year of the war, more than a thousand signal units and subunits of various types were formed. They also included signal battalions of the Military Reconstruction Directorate of the People's Commissariat of Communications, created in January 1942. They took a direct part in providing communication between the General Staff and the frontal staffs, and in restoring trunk lines and communication centers.

As we know, one of the steps taken by the Supreme Command General Headquarters in the first months of the war to reorganize troop command and control was to abolish the corps level. This made creation of additional troop command organs--auxiliary control posts (VPU's)--necessary. Separate signal battalions began to be formed in the frontal reserves in June 1942 to provide communication with VPU's.

Separate signal battalions were formed in the RVGK [Supreme Command Reserve] in the first period of the war to provide communication with General Headquarters liaison officers and to coordinate the actions of the front; these battalions were given the mission of deploying and servicing special communication centers.

The field communication organs of the People's Commissariat of Communications were abolished at the end of the first period of the war, and their units were subordinated to the frontal communications directorates and army signal departments.

A number of organizational steps were taken in the second period of the war (from November 1942 to the end of December 1943) to improve command and control. Thus separate telegraph and telephone exchange companies were created in January 1943 to permit the fastest possible restoration of telephone and telegraph communication centers along the trunk lines connecting the General Staff with the front. They were subordinated to the frontal signal chiefs.³

Beginning in spring 1943 special-purpose communication centers (USON's) began to be formed with the mission of providing wire communication between the General Staff and the staffs of operational field forces and formations of the Supreme Command Reserve, operating within a given strategic sector. They were serviced by separate RVGK signal battalions. Later on separate signal regiments were also put to use for the same purpose.⁴

In April 1943, when the corps level of command was restored, separate signal battalions began to be formed. Separate signal battalions in the rifle divisions were reorganized into separate signal companies with the goal of freeing personnel to man the corps signal departments and battalions.

In summer 1943 nine separate radio battalions and five separate radio companies were formed in order to increase the radio resources of fronts operating in the main sectors.⁵ The organization of frontal units now included a separate radio battalion or separate radio company, which broadened the possibilities of providing radio communication with tank armies and with tank, mechanized and cavalry corps.

The depth of army and frontal rear services grew to 100 km and more as the scope of offensive operations increased in the second period of the war. Because of the absence of organic communication resources intended for control of rear services, some of the resources intended for operational communications had to be withdrawn for such use. But this did not solve the problem. Therefore to improve control of rear services, separate rear services signal companies began to be formed within each front in September 1943. These companies were given the mission of providing communication between frontal rear services control points and rear units and services.

In all in 1943, 464 units and subunits were formed, to include 11 separate signal regiments and 175 separate signal battalions.⁶

In the second period of the war the structure of the signal troops underwent further improvement. Thus in October 1943, to achieve more-flexible troop command and control, a new assortment of units was introduced to operational field forces,⁷ such that the front now possessed a separate signal regiment, a separate reserve signal battalion (to support VPU's), a radio battalion, a telegraph and telephone exchange company, two line signal battalions, and two line-construction companies. In addition to these units, each army in a front was to possess one line signal battalion and two separate companies--telegraph line construction and telegraph operations. The combined-arms army now included a separate signal regiment, a separate line signal battalion, a telegraph line construction company and four line-construction companies.

For the first time, the signal units of a tank army now included a separate signal regiment (rather than a battalion), two line-construction companies and one telegraph operations company.⁸

It should also be noted that in January 1943 the State Defense Committee published a decree defining the mutual relationships between signal units of the People's Commissariat of Internal Affairs and the GUSKA. Signal units of the People's Commissariat of Internal Affairs were given the mission of supporting only high-frequency (HF) communication. The General Staff's operations directorate was responsible for providing internal communication for the General Staff, and for solving some problems associated with communication planning.⁹ As a result of these changes, the responsibility for managing communications between the General Staff and the fronts was laid fully on the shoulders of the GUSKA. In this same year new manning tables were approved for frontal communication directorates and army signal departments. The posts of chiefs of communication links with each army of a front were introduced into the front, as was the post of communications directorate deputy chief of the auxiliary control post.¹⁰ For the first time the army signal department was broken down into divisions, each of which was responsible for communication provided by specific types of communication resources (radio, wire, and so on).

The organization of signal troops continued to improve in the third period of the war (from January 1944 to 9 May 1945), during which Soviet troops conducted their most important offensive operations, including beyond the borders of our motherland. This made the work of the signal troops more difficult. A number of difficulties arose in using the communication systems of liberated countries: Detailed diagrams of their organization were absent, there were cases of sabotage along communication lines and in communication centers, and our specialists were not sufficiently familiar with the foreign equipment. In order to satisfy the needs of the command and the Soviet military administration, commandant's offices were created in all major communication centers and communication commandants were appointed. As Soviet troops advanced, the number of commandant's offices grew and their management became more difficult. In order to improve control over them and to make maximum use of local resources, special-purpose communication centers (USSN's) were created in June 1944;¹¹ in view of their sizeable number, they were grouped together into communication center zones, which were placed under the charge of commandants.

A special department of GUSKA's Operational-Technical Directorate managed signal units directly subordinated to GUSKA.

A large amount of experience was accumulated during the war in providing communication under different combat conditions. It became necessary to study and generalize this experience and bring it to the awareness of the troops, training institutions and communication services. This mission was assigned to a department organized in GUSKA in April 1944 to study the war experience, and to a department created in September 1944 in GUSKA's Armament Directorate to study the experience of operating communication resources.

The composition of the main departments of frontal communication directorates was expanded somewhat in 1944, which improved their capabilities. Signal groups were created in army signal departments to provide communications to army artillery commanders. This helped to improve management of artillery.

The quantity of RVGK signal troops increased in 1944-1945 in connection with growth in the scope of offensive operations and elongation of the communication trunk lines (they reached a length of 1000 km and more). A GKO [State Defense Committee] decree ordered creation of an additional 10 separate line-operation signal battalions by November 1944. Five repair and restoration signal battalions were transferred to GUSKA from the People's Commissariat of Communications.¹³ In all in 1944, GUSKA formed more than 80 RVGK signal units.

About 130 different signal units were also deployed in the fronts and districts in 1944. In all during this year, 210 signal units were added to the existing strength through the efforts of GUSKA, the fronts and the districts.¹⁴ New signal units and subunits were also deployed in the armies, corps and divisions.

The composition of tank army signal troops was changed at the beginning of 1944 in connection with growth in the proportion of armored and mechanized troops within the overall organization of the armed forces. The number of signal units in the tank army was raised by 20 percent. This significantly improved the capabilities of army signal units and promoted more-reliable communication with formations and units of tank field forces.

The higher requirements on control of the units and subunits of the rifle division necessitated significant reinforcement of signal resources and manpower. The rifle division's signal company did not have the capability for supporting flexible and continuous troop command and control. In this connection a GKO decree and an NKO [People's Commissariat of Defense] order published in November 1944 reformed the divisional signal companies that had replaced signal battalions in 1943 into separate signal battalions.¹⁵

In January 1945 seven separate RVGK signal brigades were formed for the first time.¹⁶ Their composition included signal, construction and operations battalions. With their creation, it became no longer necessary to have a separate chief of an operational communication link. His responsibilities were transferred to the brigade commander, who was simultaneously the chief of the operational communication link. The experience of using RVGK signal brigades justified their existence completely in the war years.

By the beginning of the concluding operations of the Great Patriotic War, the Main Communication Directorate had separate signal brigades, regiments, battalions, and companies of different purposes at its disposal. The demand of the Supreme Command General Headquarters and the General Staff for different forms of communication was fully satisfied.

The availability of communication resources in the signal troops, and especially radio resources, grew continuously during the war. Before the war, the wire communication resources of the signal troops included Baudot, ST-35 and Morse telegraph instruments and UNA-I and UNA-F telephone sets; their radio resources included the obsolete 11AK, 5AK, 11SK, 13SK and 71TK radio sets, and new sets such as the RAT, RAP, RSB, RB and others. However, the country's low economic possibilities, coupled with formation of a large quantity of new formations and units in the prewar years, made it impossible to fully outfit the troops with the signal resources they needed at the beginning of the war. Their equipment strength was as follows: RAT radio sets for the radio networks of the General Staff and the fronts--39 percent, army and airfield networks--46, division networks--61, regiment networks--77, battalion networks--58 percent; wire communication resources: ST-35 instruments--35 percent, Baudot instruments--69 percent, induction telephone sets--47 percent.

Growth in the production of communication apparatus at enterprises redeployed in the East during the war made it possible to supply an ever-increasing quantity of modernized and new instruments. By as early as the end of 1941 and start of 1942 the plants began supplying RBM, 12RP, 9R, 10R, RSB-F, RAP-KV-3 and other radio sets, and UNA-I-41, UNA-I-42 and UNA-F-41 telephone sets. In 1943 a new field telegraph instrument, the 2BDA-43, was designed. The troops received it in 1944. In late 1943 the troops began receiving the standard model TAI-43 telephone set. In comparison with 1942 the deliveries of communication resources to the troops grew significantly in 1943: by 192 percent for RAT radio sets, by 188 percent for RV radio sets, by 320 percent for Baudot telegraph instruments, by 207 percent for ST-35 telegraph instruments and by 130 percent for telephone sets.

Concurrently with growth in the number of radio sets, their quality improved as well. In the third period of the war the troops were already using improved and

new A-7A, A-7B, RSM-5 and RSB-3 radio sets, and the RAF-KV-5, which was supplied with a "Karbid" instrument to provide printed radio communication in the front-army communication link. Their total number grew significantly in the fronts. Thus by the beginning of the Vistula-Oder operation (12 January - 3 February 1945) each front possessed 12,000 radio sets.¹⁷ The number of radio sets in the rifle division increased by six times from the beginning of the war to 1945 (their number increased from 22 to 130). As a result the number of radio sets per kilometer of front increased, making it necessary to organize the allocation of radio frequencies, not only between fronts and armed services but also between different people's commissariats and departments. To solve this problem, a radio wave service department was created in GUSKA's Operational-Technical Directorate; this marked the beginning of creation of the frequency control service in the signal troops.

Lone airplanes allocated by the air force headquarters and the Main Directorate of the Civil Air Fleet were used for liaison between the General Staff and the frontal and army staff at the beginning of the war. But by as early as December 1941 the 233d Separate Air Force Air Liaison Squadron was formed. It was subordinated operationally to the GUSKA chief. The needs of the General Staff were also tended to by the 2d Air Squadron of the Moscow Special-Purpose Air Group, which was subsequently reorganized into a special air liaison group of the GVF [Civil Air Fleet].

However, the small quantity of diverse types of airplanes within the composition of the air squadron and the special air group could not fully satisfy the General Staff's demand for communication with the fronts and armies. Therefore an NKO order dated 3 December 1942 formed the 3d Separate Air Liaison Division out of the GVF Special Air Liaison Group. This division was subordinated to the GUSKA chief. It consisted of two air regiments, a separate airlift detachment and an air base maintenance battalion (BAO). The experience of using this air formation to support the General Staff's communication with the fronts and armies confirmed the correctness of its creation.

Prior to October 1943 the frontal and army staffs possessed air liaison squadrons. The army's squadron consisted of six U-2 airplanes while the air squadron of the frontal staff (in some cases there were two squadrons) possessed 19-20 U-2 and R-5 aircraft. In October 1943 the liaison squadrons were replaced by air liaison regiments in order to satisfy the growing demand of the fronts and tank armies.

Discussing the main trends in the development of the organizational structure of the signal troops during the war, we should note the following.

First of all, the strength of the signal troops grew significantly. A large number of new signal units were created throughout the entire war, as a result of which their capabilities for supporting troop command and control increased constantly. By the end of the war the signal troops represented 10 percent of the armed forces,¹⁸ and their total strength grew by a factor of four in comparison with the beginning of the war.¹⁹

Second, significant qualitative changes occurred in the signal troops. Their equipment availability improved continuously, which made it much easier for frontal and army commanders to control the troops.

Third, control of the signal troops was constantly improved, and it became centralized. Management of state and military communications was unified, and the quantity of signal forces and resources providing services to the Supreme Command General Headquarters and the General Staff was increased.

The highly rich experience acquired by the signal troops during the Great Patriotic War was used as the basis for their postwar development. Study of the accumulated experience, with a consideration for the fundamental qualitative changes that have occurred in the armed forces, is a dependable guarantee of successful development and improvement of the signal troops.

FOOTNOTES

1. The number of signal units possessed by frontal and army staffs did not remain constant. It depended on fighting strength, and it was determined by the appropriate norms.
2. "Voyennyye svyazisty v dni voyny i mira" [Military Signalmen in Days of War and Peace], Voenizdat, 1968, p 141.
3. TsAMO SSSR [Central Archives of the USSR Ministry of Defense], f. 71, op. 12171, d. 130, l. 122.
4. Peresypkin, I. T., "Svyaz' v Velikoy Otechestvennoy voyne" [Communications in the Great Patriotic War], Moscow, "Nauka", 1973, pp 85-86.
5. Ibid., p 47.
6. TsAMO, f. 71, op. 12171, d. 236, ll. 1-6.
7. Ibid., pp 38-39.
8. Ibid., d. 165, l. 136.
9. Ibid., d. 131, ll. 1-8.
10. Ibid., d. 100, l. 127.
11. Ibid., f. 71, op. 12169, d. 48, ll. 61-68.
13. Ibid., op. 12169, d. 48, l. 130.
14. Ibid., op. 12171, d. 336, ll. 29-30
15. Ibid., d. 253, l. 64.
16. "Voyennyye svyazisty v dni voyny i mira," p 209.
17. TsAMO, f. 71, op. 12178, d. 141, ll. 10-11.

18. "Voyennyye svyazisty v dni voyny i mira," p. 290.
19. "Istoriya Velikoy Otechestvennoy voyny Sovetskogo Soyuza 1941-1945" [History of the Great Patriotic War of the Soviet Union 1941-1945], Vol 6, Voenizdat, 1965, p 208.

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WARTIME RIFLE DIVISION ON DEFENSE IN MOUNTAINS

Moscow VOYENNO-ISTORICHESKIY ZHURNAL in Russian No 4, Apr 81 (signed to press 20 Feb 81) pp 28-34

[Article, published under the heading "The Great Patriotic War" and the subheading "Tactics," by Lt Col V. Volkov: "Defensive Combat of the 383d Rifle Division in Mountains]

[Text] On 20 August 1942, in the course of the battle of the Caucasus, the 383d Rifle Division (commander, Major General K. I. Provalov), consisting of the 691st, 694th and 696th rifle regiments, the 966th Artillery Regiment, the 28th Separate Tank Destroyer Battalion and other subunits of the 18th Army, occupied defenses on a line extending along mounts Oplepen, Gunay and Geyman (see map).*

Recognizing that its armed forces were no longer in a position to attack on a broad front, the fascist German command decided to thrust toward Tuapse with the forces of the 17th Army, reach the coast of the Black Sea, and circle and annihilate the 18th Army, and cut the Black Sea troop grouping off from the main forces of the Transcaucasian Front.

The region southwest of Maykop in which the division was defending itself was a complex system of mountains and ridges up to 1,100 meters high, cut in different directions by a large number of deep ravines and gullies. Because the roadless terrain in which the 383d Rifle Division was operating was ill-suited to offensive action by large enemy combined-arms formations, and because this sector was felt to be secondary, the formation was given a broad strip to defend, 24 km along its front.**

At first, only the German 97th Mountain Rifle Division prepared for going over to the offensive against the 383d Rifle Division. However, in mid-September the enemy began regrouping, and by the 25th it had concentrated General Lantz's assault group in this area. The group consisted of two mountain rifle and one motorized regiment, a reserve battalion, a motorcycle squadron, a reinforced infantry battalion and two artillery battalions. The ratio of forces became 3:1 in favor of the Germans.*** Making his decision, the commander of the 383d Rifle Division tried to create a strong defense that would keep the enemy from breaking through in the direction of


*TsAMO SSSR, [Central Archives of the USSR Ministry of Defense], f. 1704, op. 1, d. 1, ll. 3-4.

**Ibid., d. 11, l. 132.

***Ibid., d. 1, l. 3.

Tuapse and reaching the Black Sea coast. In addition to preparing defenses throughout the entire zone, Major General K. I. Provalov decided to concentrate his main efforts on holding the tactically most important summits--Mount Oplepen, Hill 947.3, and mounts Gunay and Geyman. The combat formation was organized as a single echelon. The units were given the following missions: The 691st Rifle Regiment (commander, Major D. I. Mel'nikov) was ordered to defend an area bounded by Mount Oplepen, Hill 947.3 and Hill 567.5, and to keep the enemy from breaking through from around the village of Chervyakov in the direction of the population center of Maratuki; the 694th Rifle Regiment (commander, Major Sh. I. Kipiani) was to defend an area 1 km west of Hill 947.3, Mount Gunay and the population center of Kotlovina, having two rifle battalions in his possession (the 2d Battalion was the division commander's reserves), and to block the advance of the Germans in the direction of Mount Belaya and the population centers of Krasnoye Kladbishche and Kotlovina; the 696th Rifle Regiment (commander, Major A. D. Pavlov) was given the mission of defending the division's left flank, on a line extending from Mount Gunay to Mount Geyman, and keeping the enemy from breaking through in the direction of Mount Lysaya and the village of Sezh.*

Defensive Combat of the 383d Rifle Division in the Mountains
(26 September - 2 October 1942)



Key:

- | | |
|-----------------|----------------------------------|
| 1. Orenburg | 8. Maratuki |
| 2. Mount Geyman | 9. Kushino |
| 3. Mount Lysaya | 10. Mount Oplepen |
| 4. Mount Gunay | 11. Krasnoye Kladbishche |
| 5. Gunayka | 12. Mount Belaya |
| 6. Sezh | 13. Chervyakov |
| 7. Kotlovina | 14. Training battalion (reserve) |

*TsAMO, f. 1704, op. 1, d. 31, l. 19.

The division had the following reserves: a training battalion in the forest, 3 km west of Maratuki, and the 2/694th Rifle Regiment, in a forest a kilometer and a half south of the village of Gunayka. These subunits had to be ready to counterattack in the direction of mounts Gunay and Geyman. Motor transportation was allocated for transfer of the reserves, and a lateral trail connecting Maratuki, Kotlovina and Gunayka was adapted for motor vehicle traffic. On order of the division commander the rifle regiments advanced forward detachments to the vicinity of the town of Chervyakov and mounts Belaya, Geyman and Lysaya. These detachments had a strength varying from a reinforced rifle company to a rifle battalion, and their mission was to hold the enemy's forward subunits by stubbornly defending their occupied positions, and force the enemy to deploy his main forces in combat formation.* The unique features in the organization of the defenses of the 383d Rifle Division, which was operating on a broad front in mountain conditions, include the following.

Attempting to cover all approaches, the commander organized the division's combat formation into a single echelon. Defense in depth was organized only in sectors suitable for an enemy attack. These defenses, which were located in the tactically most important areas, were manned by divisional and regimental reserves.

The basic units of the regimental (divisional) defenses were the battalion defensive areas, which contained company strongpoints (one antitank gun, three or four 50-mm mortars, one or two medium machineguns, five or six light machineguns and 20-30 riflemen armed with automatic and conventional rifles), prepared for ring defense. Twenty-four hour patrols were organized between the strongpoints. Gullies, narrow trails and gaps were covered by mortar and machinegun fire. Artillery was decentralized.

Defensive fire task areas were determined beforehand in order to destroy enemy infantry before the forward edge of defense and within the defenses themselves. The initial data for the defensive fire were determined area by area with sighting fire, and written down on the gun shields together with the name of the defensive fire task area and its call signal. Moving barrages were planned against previously designated lines in sectors suited to tank travel. Considering the difficult conditions of the forested mountains and the great breadth of the defensive zone, the division commander and the commanders of the rifle regiments transferred a significant part of their fire weapons to the rifle battalions.

The fire plan for each battalion defense area ensured quick concentration of fire in any threatened sector or area, and creation of pockets of fire. Fire weapons were deployed covertly and in dispersed fashion in such a way that the enemy could be struck from the reverse slopes of hills and from deep within the defenses with high-density flanking, cross and surprise short-range concentrated fire at the approaches to the forward edge, and especially at the boundaries and flanks and in the gaps between strongpoints. Several back-up fire positions were prepared on the reverse slopes of hills to permit maneuver of fire weapons.

Frontal fire was extensively combined with flanking fire as well as with high-trajectory artillery and mortar fire. Special attention was turned in preparing the defenses to creation of multilevel fire. For defense of hills, two levels of fire were created in each company and one level of fire was created in each platoon. The bulk of the fire weapons were concentrated on the first level.

*Ibid., d. 30, ll. 6-7.

Having occupied their defensive areas, the division's units began engineer preparations of their positions at full steam. By the beginning of the German offensive 850 weapon pits, 43 machinegun pits and artillery fire positions, six observation posts for company commanders and three observation posts for battalion commanders were set up, eight nests for automatic riflemen were prepared in trees, fire lanes were cleared, and 4,980 linear meters of tree barriers were laid in the battalion and company defensive areas. The division's sappers made 32 km of mountain trails passable for vehicles, and they laid a motor road connecting Maratuki, Kotlovina and Gunayka.*

Besides tree barriers, the troops set up antitank and antipersonnel minefields. They were created out of all available models of mines, antitank and antipersonnel land mines, hand grenades and gun shells. Special attention was turned to mining the roads and terrain which enemy subunits of all branches of troops could utilize for their attack. However, because of the limited manpower and equipment and the lack of time, the division was unable to complete the enormous volume of engineer operations throughout the entire 24-kilometer zone. Therefore engineer preparations were made only in those areas that were occupied by troops, and basically only within the limits of battalion defensive areas.

Special attention was turned to organizing coordination. The division staff (chief, Colonel N. V. Chudakov) drew up the coordinating procedure table. The subunits knew precisely what their missions and the missions of their neighbors were. The commanders of rifle units and subunits called up artillery fire as required. Artillery and mortar fire could be called up with the help of the coordinating procedure table to annihilate the attacking enemy both at the forward edge and deep within our defenses at any time.

The 383d Rifle Division was well experienced in combat. The formation commander and his staff heeded the fact that attacking fascist German troops as a rule struck the flanks and the boundaries between units. Therefore much attention was devoted to protecting the flanks and boundaries. The boundary with the 32d Rifle Division was covered by a strongpoint in the vicinity of Mount Gayman, by a forward detachment deployed on Mount Lysaya and by artillery of the 696th Rifle Regiment, while the boundary with the 31st Rifle Division was covered by a strongpoint on Mount Oplepen and by artillery of the 691st Rifle Regiment. Within the division, the flanks of the subunits and units were covered by dense fire from medium and light machineguns.

The broadness of the division's defensive zone, the poorly developed road network and the mountainous nature of the terrain elicited a number of difficulties in communications.

The division could count only on its own signal battalion to provide stable communication with its units and its neighbors. There was not enough telephone cable, radio sets, and especially storage batteries. Communication was provided within the formation and with the staff of the 18th Army and neighbors by radio, wire (telephone, telegraph) and mobile resources. In addition runners were used for communication between rifle battalions and rifle companies.

*TsAMO, f. 1704, op. 1, d. 30, l. 2.

The commander and staff directed their main reconnaissance efforts at excluding the possibility of the enemy's surprise initiation of an offensive, and his covert maneuver with the purpose of attaining the flank and rear of defending subunits. A ring of observation posts was organized at the front, on the flanks and in gaps between units, specially created detachments conducted patrols, and ambushes were set up. Observers were located on slopes at several levels in order to achieve a better view of the terrain. Although it was late in doing so, reconnaissance did manage to reveal a concentration of a large number of troops opposite units of the 383d Rifle Division.

Considering the enemy's air superiority, the division commander and staff turned special attention to organizing air defense. A platoon of heavy antiaircraft machineguns was deployed on hillsides at different elevations to permit successful opposition to airplanes flying low along valleys. The medium and light machineguns of the units and subunits were prepared for fire against diving enemy aircraft.

Party-political work conducted purposefully under the guidance of division military commissar Regimental Commissar Ya. I. Korniyak had great significance to preparing the personnel for the impending combat. It was aimed at ensuring precise execution of the combat orders of commanders, at inspiring courage and valor in the soldiers, and at raising the fighting efficiency of the units and subunits.

The division newspaper and leaflets published by the subunits contained information on the military oath, and on the bravery and heroism of warriors and commanders. Much attention was devoted to organizing and maintaining stubborn defense in forested mountains, and to enemy tactics. Party-political work helped to strengthen discipline and the fighting efficiency of the units and subunits in encounters with the enemy.

The Germans began their offensive within the defensive zone of the 383d Rifle Division on 26 September at 0500 hours with intense air preparation. Groups of 20-40 airplanes bombed the positions of our troops on mounts Gunay and Geyman and the population centers of Gunayka, Kotlovina and Maratuki throughout the entire day. Each raid lasted up to 15 minutes, and then, after a pause of 15-20 minutes, the next groups of airplanes appeared.*

At 1200 hours the fascist attacked the forward detachment of the 696th Rifle Regiment from the north with a force of up to two infantry battalions, attempting to breach the defenses at the boundary between the 383d and 32d Guards Rifle divisions. Believing that the intense air and artillery preparation had significantly weakened our defenses, enemy infantry advanced in tight lines. Artillery, mortar, rifle and machinegun fire from the forward detachment almost completely annihilated the enemy's first line. Suffering high losses in the minefield, enemy infantry advanced slowly, attempting to bypass Mount Lysaya on the flank. As a result of a stubborn battle that lasted 2.5 hours, a significant proportion of the Germans that had fallen into a pocket of fire were annihilated. Only a few survived to withdraw to their forming-up places.

*TsAMO, f. 1704, op. 1, d. 1, ll. 3-4.

The next enemy attack began at 1630 hours. By this time the right flank of the neighboring 509th Rifle Regiment, 32d Guards Rifle Division had been pushed northwest, and the fascists attempted to bypass Mount Geyman with a force of up to one infantry battalion, creating a threat on the left flank of the 696th Rifle Regiment. Assuming that the enemy had already made his main thrust in the direction of the 696th Rifle Regiment's defensive area, the division commander advanced his reserves (the 2/694th Rifle Regiment) to the western slope of Mount Geyman, replacing it on the night of 27 September by a training battalion transferred by motor vehicle from Maratuki. At the same time Major General K. I. Provalov moved his observation post to Mount Geyman.

On 27 September at 0400 hours the enemy resumed his offensive against the forward detachment of the 696th Rifle Regiment from the north with a force of up to one infantry battalion, and against Mount Geyman from the north and west with a strength of up to three infantry battalions.

A fierce battle developed. Despite the fact that the 696th Rifle Regiment's forward detachment was able to ward off all attacks, the regiment's position remained extremely grave. Its combat formations were subjected to continuous bombing from the air, and the position of the 2d and 3d rifle companies as well as of the 2d Battalion, 694th Rifle Regiment, which were defending Mount Geyman, became critical, since the enemy was simultaneously attacking them from the north and west with forces enjoying a three-time superiority. Located on Mount Geyman, the division commander deployed his last reserves--the training battalion--on the western slope. A decisive counter-attack by the battalion halted the enemy's advance, and tactically important Mount Geyman remained in our hands.

On 27 September, at 1800 hours, up to a battalion of enemy soldiers attacked Mount Gunay in the defensive area of the 694th Rifle Regiment. Unable to succeed with a frontal attack, the fascists bypassed the mountain on the west and, committing fresh reserves, they began penetrating deep into our defenses in a southwesterly direction. Concurrently, by striking from the north, they were able to knock the 4th Rifle Company away from its positions and capture Mount Gunay.

In an effort to regain his position and avert further penetration of the enemy, the division commander advanced the 7th Rifle Company, 694th Rifle Regiment and an automatic rifle company of the 696th Rifle Regiment to this area. Making a swift counterattack, they halted the advance of enemy subunits. Two days of stubborn fighting made it clear that the fascists were making their main thrust in the direction of Mount Gunay and Geyman. At the price of high losses (up to 800 men killed*), the enemy did manage to penetrate the defenses in the defensive area of the 694th Rifle Regiment. Securing Mount Gunay, on 28 September the enemy continued his offensive along the entire front, simultaneously trying to reach Hill 307.2 and the population center of Gunayka, and capture Mount Geyman with a thrust from the east, north and west. He left up to a battalion of infantry on Mount Gunay, and about a regiment of infantry began advancing toward Hill 307.2.**

In the intense battle for Mount Geyman, seven attacks were repelled. The mountain remained in our hands, but the forward detachment found itself cut off from the

*TsAMO, f. 1704, op. 1, d. 31, ll. 53-54.

Ibid.

main forces. The division commander decided to take back Mount Gunay with a counter-attack by two companies of the 694th Rifle Regiment and one company of the 696th Rifle Regiment, and to hold, with the remaining forces (three rifle companies), enemy troops attacking in the direction of Hill 307.2. A successful counterattack by the three rifle companies, supported by fire from two batteries of guards mortars, made the return of Mount Gunay possible by 1100 hours. However, committing new reserves to combat, the enemy recaptured it.

Meanwhile three companies of the 696th Rifle Regiment opposing the advance of the Germans toward Hill 307.2 fought off five attacks and contained the enemy a kilometer and a half from the northeast side of this hill. The situation in the defense area of the 691st Rifle Regiment also grew complicated. At 0800 hours two infantry battalions attacked the forward detachment of the 691st Rifle Regiment from Chervyakov, outflanked it, and by 1000 hours they engaged battle outposts between Hill 793.7 and Hill 747.3 in combat. On order of the regimental commander, the forward detachment withdrew to Mount Oplepen.

By the end of the day the forward detachments of the 694th and 696th Rifle Regiments were cut off from the main forces. The threat of the enemy's further penetration toward Hill 307.2, Gunayka and Kotlovina remained. In the evening of 28 September the 1st Battalion, 177th Rifle Regiment, 31st Rifle Division was transferred to the division commander. On 29 September the Germans tried to exploit their offensive toward Gunayka and Kotlovina, and concurrently capture Mount Geyman.

Up to two infantry regiments concentrated against the defenders of Mount Geyman, up to a regiment of infantry continued to attack Hill 307.2, and up to a regiment of infantry advanced on the left flank of the 691st Rifle Regiment.

Major General K. I. Provalov decided to take back Mount Gunay with a counterattack, and simultaneously break the forward detachments of the 694th and 696th rifle regiments out of their encirclement. At 0730 hours the 1st Battalion, 177th Rifle Regiment and survivors of two companies of the 694th Rifle Regiment began their counterattack with the support of artillery and mortar fire, but on reaching the southern slope of the mountain they were subjected to aerial bombing, and then an attack by two enemy infantry battalions, which forced them to withdraw beyond the Gunayka River.

Concurrently the 696th Rifle Regiment was able to rescue its surrounded forward detachment, but by 1300 hours its subunits were forced to abandon Mount Geyman in the face of superior enemy forces, and withdraw to a line between Hill 307.2 and Hill 495.0. A gap up to 4 kilometers wide, through which the enemy began infiltrating, was formed between the 694th and 696th rifle regiments. Exploiting their offensive in the direction of Hill 947.3, by 1300 hours on 29 September the fascists were able to capture Hill 793.7 in the 691st Rifle Regiment's defensive area. A gap up to 3 kilometers wide also formed between the 691st and 694th rifle regiments. The fighting died down once again with the onset of darkness.

On 30 September the reserves of the 18th Army reached Kotlovina. Remnants of the 694th Rifle Regiment and the army reserves remained in position of the village at the end of the day. The 696th Rifle Regiment stood its ground on its former line, and the 691st Rifle Regiment occupied defenses on a line between Mount Oplepen

and the population center of Kushino, organizing its combat formation with its front facing west. On 2 October the 40th Separate Rifle Brigade, which had concentrated near the village of Pereval'nyy (not shown on the map), went over to the offensive and forced the enemy north. The 383d Rifle Division (less the 691st Rifle Regiment) was withdrawn into the army reserve.

* * *

In the course of stubborn fighting, while defending on a broad front in forests and mountains against a triply superior enemy under the constant influence of his bomber aviation, the 383d Rifle Division was able to hold the right flank of its defenses. At the price of high losses, the Germans managed to wedge themselves into the center to a depth of just 5 kilometers, and 2 kilometers on the left flank.

The average rate of advance of the fascists did not exceed 1 km per day. Counting just the men killed, the enemy's total losses during this period were 3,000.*

The division's defensive combat was characterized by stubbornness, high aggressiveness and extensive maneuvering of men and equipment. Firm retention of advantageous natural lines was combined with counterattacks against the penetrating enemy. In this case not only reserves but also subunits from inactive sectors were utilized. As a result of the counterattack, the enemy suffered significant losses, and his advance was blocked. Advancement of forward detachments varying from company to battalion strength had great significance to the steadfastness of the defenses. These detachments were able to hold the enemy back for a long time.

Air cover organized with divisional resources to protect friendly troops from enemy air strikes was not very effective. There were no antiaircraft artillery guns, and the heavy machinegun platoon that was available could not reliably cover the subunits against the enemy's massed use of aviation.

The combat experience of the 383d Rifle Division demonstrated that when a combat formation is organized as a single echelon, strong reserves, deployed in different places and at road junctions so as to permit extensive maneuver, acquire special significance. Thus during the fighting the division commander competently and promptly transferred the training battalion 25 km by motor vehicle.

*TsAMO, f. 1704, op. 1, d. 31, ll. 75-88.

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AIR DEFENSE TROOPS: WARTIME ACCOMPLISHMENTS NOTED

Moscow VOYENNO-ISTORICHESKIY ZHURNAL in Russian No 4, Apr 81(signed to press 20 Feb 81)pp 46-47

[Article, published under the heading "Documents and Materials," by Col O. Frantsev: "Some Results of the Combat Employment of National Air Defense Troops in the Years of the Great Patriotic War"]

[Text] During the Great Patriotic War the National Air Defense Forces honorably fulfilled the missions assigned to them by the Communist Party and the Soviet government. The largest industrial, cultural and administrative centers and thousands of population centers in our motherland were preserved from destruction by fascist aviation, which was important to keeping industry and transportation working hard and maintaining the population's morale high.

The Communist Party and Soviet government showed constant concern for strengthening the National Air Defense Forces. Evidence of this can be found in particular in the continual growth of equipment availability (see table) and the almost twofold increase in manning during the war.

The National Air Defense Forces not only grew quantitatively and qualitatively, but also they essentially transformed into a new, independent armed service, capable of executing a broad range of tactical, operational and strategic missions. By the end of the war their composition included four fronts, five armies, one fighter air army, 15 corps, 18 divisions, five separate antiaircraft brigades, four fighter air corps and 24 fighter air divisions.

The National Air Defense Forces annihilated 7,313 airplanes; this includes 3,930 aircraft knocked down in aerial combat and 238 aircraft put out of commission at airfields by fighter aviation, and 2,654 brought down by antiaircraft artillery. Antiaircraft machineguns, armored trains, barrage balloons and other resources claimed 491 airplanes. In addition a significant quantity of enemy tanks and infantry were destroyed.

Concurrently with development of the tactics of the branches of troops, which proceeded along the lines of integrated utilization of air defense forces and resources, the art of war witnessed formation of a new area associated with preparation and conduct of combat activities by major formations and field forces--the operational art of the National Air Defense Forces.

**Growth in Armament of the National Air Defense
Forces During the Great Patriotic War***

<u>Armament</u>	<u>At War's Start</u>	<u>At War's End</u>
Fighters	1500	3100
Medium antiaircraft guns	3329	9800
Light antiaircraft guns	330	Over 8900
Antiaircraft machineguns	650	8100
Antiaircraft searchlights	1500	5400
and barrage balloons	850	1400
Warning radar	Up to 45	230

*See VOYENNO-ISTORICHESKIY ZHURNAL, No 4, 1975, p 48; "Sovetskaya Voyennaya Entsiklopediya" [Soviet Military Encyclopedia], Vol 2, Voenizdat, 1976, p 317.

A new principle of national air defense came into being in 1941--the zonal principle, in accordance with which units and formations of the National Air Defense Forces were used as a unified grouping to cover specific industrial regions. In the second and third periods of the war, air defense exhibited a clearly pronounced zonal nature in the main sectors of operations of the ground troops (the battle of Kursk, the battle for the Dniepr, and the Vistula-Oder, East Prussian and other operations).

Operational and strategic maneuver of air defense forces and resources from within the country was an innovation in the use of the National Air Defense Forces. Forces were regrouped mainly out of regions which became unreachable by enemy aviation. As a result objectives in the combat zone were covered just as reliably as the most important centers in rear areas within range of the enemy air force.

Surrounded enemy groupings were also subjected to aerial blockades in coordination with frontal fighter aviation and antiaircraft artillery (at Stalingrad, Budapest, Breslau, Königsberg and Berlin). Air defense operations essentially came into being in the course of the war. As a rule they were conducted by the National Air Defense Forces in coordination with other armed services (to foil massed raids on Leningrad, Moscow, Kursk and other cities).

In summer 1943 control of the National Air Defense Forces and troop air defense forces was concentrated in the hands of a single person--the Soviet Army commander of artillery. Unfortunately the central organs responsible for combined leadership of all air defense troops did not enjoy further development during the war. Nevertheless the men and equipment of the National Air Defense Forces and the air defense forces of the ground troops were utilized in very close coordination.

The Communist Party and Soviet government held the combat activities of the National Air Defense Forces in high esteem. Orders and medals were awarded to 80,00 enlisted men and officers; 93 of them became heroes of the Soviet Union, and fighter pilot Captain A. T. Karpov was awarded this title twice. Many soldiers had their names entered on unit rolls in perpetuity; 29 units and formations received the Guards title, and 11 earned honorary names.

The Great Patriotic War irrefutably proved the especially important significance of powerful, stable and insurmountable country air defenses not only to supporting the work of the rear services but also to successful conduct of operations in theaters of war.

Following the war the National Air Defense Forces underwent qualitative change. They are now outfitted with menacing weapons--modern antiaircraft missile complexes, all-weather supersonic fighters carrying missile armament, high-power radiotechnical resources and automated control and guidance systems, and their mission is to foil any attack by the air forces of an aggressor, and thus ensure the viability of our state and the combat effectiveness of its armed forces.

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SOVIET-CUBAN MILITARY COOPERATION DESCRIBED

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[Article, published under the heading "In the Armies of the Socialist Countries," by Vice President of Soviet-Cuban Friendship Society RSU Army General I. Shkadov: "Soviet-Cuban Brotherhood-in-Arms"]

[Text] The history of the fraternal relations between the USSR and the Republic of Cuba represents many years of cooperation in all spheres of the life and activities of the two sovereign states.

In the Accountability Report to the 26th CPSU Congress, CPSU Central Committee General Secretary Comrade L. I. Brezhnev said that together with the countries of socialism, "we are building a new, socialist world, a historically unprecedented type of relations between states, truly just, equal, fraternal."* It is precisely in this spirit that our relations are evolving with the Republic of Cuba.

The Cuban Revolution, which overthrew the bloody tyranny of Batista, assumed a worthy place in a succession of victorious socialist revolutions beginning with Great October. Forged in the fire of class battles, the victory of the Cuban people was deeply characteristic and historically inevitable. It was the result of a stubborn, continuous struggle and of the revolutionary process in Cuba, the main phases of which were the heroic assault on the Moncada barracks on 26 July 1953, and the landing, from the "Granma", of a detachment of revolutionaries headed by Fidel Castro on 2 December 1956.

Following the victory of the revolution on 1 January 1959, the Insurrectional Army rose to the defense of the independence and state sovereignty of the republic, and the peaceful creative labor of the Cuban people. The Ministry of the Revolutionary Armed Forces of the Republic of Cuba was created on 16 October 1959. Formation of National Revolutionary Militia detachments began. Personnel of the RAF [Revolutionary Armed Forces] took an active part in implementing fundamental socioeconomic transformations in the country, in creating the first revolutionary government organs, in restoring the economy and eliminating illiteracy, in harvesting sugarcane, and in a number of other highly important and urgent affairs of the heroic Island of Freedom. A popular structure grew strong in Cuba.

*PRAVDA, 24 February 1981.

The Soviet Union was one of the first states to recognize the revolutionary government of Cuba. This helped it surmount the isolation imposed on it by U.S. imperialists in the international arena. Relations between the USSR and the people's Cuba have always been based on fraternity and cooperation. The Soviet Union helped Cuba surmount the economic blockade organized by the USA. The first treaty laying a firm foundation for further close economic and, later on, military cooperation between our countries was signed in February 1960.

American imperialism had no wish to make peace with the victory of the revolution in Cuba. In its hatred of the freedom-loving Cuban people, in addition to an economic blockade it resorted many times to acts of direct aggression. The USA began advertising plans for liquidating the revolutionary achievements of the Cubans, using for this purpose counterrevolutionaries, mercenaries and bandit and sabotage groups brought into Cuba from outside.

At the end of 1960 the Cuban government turned to the Soviet Union and other socialist countries with a request to supply modern arms to revolutionary Cuba. This request was fulfilled. Groups of Soviet military experts began arriving together with armament and combat equipment. Cuba's defense capabilities grew stronger. And this helped it repel an invasion prepared by the United States of America.

In the morning of 15 April 1961 American-built B-26 airplanes with Cuban recognition markings on their sides bombed Havana, San Antonio de los Baños and Santiago de Cuba, as well as airfields of the Cuban Air Force adjacent to these cities.

At dawn on 17 April 1961 American warships and transport vessels entered the Bay of Pigs on the Cuban south coast under fighter cover. The landing of a "brigade" of counterrevolutionary mercenaries, consisting of 1,500 men trained in the USA, Guatemala and other countries, began. They had no doubts about their success, counting on support from the Pentagon.

However, the interventionists and their patrons miscalculated. Seventy-two hours after the landing on Playa Giron and Playa Larga troops of the Insurreccional Army utterly defeated and then captured more than a thousand mercenaries under Fidel Castro's leadership.*

The events at Playa Giron and the constant threat of another invasion by the USA demonstrated that if the revolutionary achievements of the people were to be protected reliably, a strong regular army outfitted with modern weapons would be needed. In mid-1961 the first regular RAF units and formations began to be formed. From this time until the end of 1963 Cuba had a volunteer army.

In order to raise combat readiness and solve the troop recruitment problem, on 26 November 1963 the Revolutionary Government enacted a law of compulsory military service in Cuba. The first draft for military service occurred in 1964 on the basis of this law.

With fraternal assistance from socialist countries, and primarily the Soviet Union, people's Cuba began creating its regular Revolutionary Armed Forces, capable of *Semin, V. V., and Shcheglov, A. P., "Armiya ostrova Svobody" [The Army of the Island of Freedom], Voenizdat, 1978, p 35.

rebuffing any aggressor. Fidel Castro said at the First PCC [Communist Party of Cuba] Congress in 1975 that the Soviet Union had provided valuable aid through military experts, who trained Cuban soldiers to use their weapons, who transmitted their knowledge of modern military science, and who were models of modesty, selflessness and a Communist attitude toward life.

I had the high honor of being one of the participants of this noble international mission. At the end of 1963 I was appointed senior expert of the Revolutionary Armed Forces of Cuba--the chief of the group of Soviet military experts in the Republic of Cuba.

One can fully understand my natural anxiety prior to setting foot on the new, unfamiliar Island of Freedom, enwreathed by heroic legends. RAF Minister Raul Castro met us with joyous, comradely greetings and friendly hugs; then we entered into a warm discussion. We were invited into a hall, and we could not but notice the youthfulness of the military leaders of the Revolutionary Armed Forces. Raul Castro introduced me to the audience. In my speech I stated my sincere gratefulness for the warm reception, emphasizing that as with all Soviet people, we, the soldiers of the Soviet Army, are prepared to render disinterested assistance to the Cuban people. We are ready to transmit our knowledge and experience as friends, as Communists, practicing proletarian internationalism. The Cuban people must know and believe that no matter how difficult the affairs of the revolution should ever become, the Soviet Union would always stand beside Cuba.

Under the guidance of the Communist Party and government, headed by Comrade Fidel Castro and relying on the fraternal assistance of the Soviet Union and other socialist countries, the heroic Cuban people defended their revolutionary achievements during the Caribbean crisis of 1962, and they persevered against the economic blockade, the total failure of which is no longer doubted by anyone today. Speaking at a meeting of Cuban-Soviet friendship in Havana on 29 January 1974, L. I. Brezhnev emphasized: "The defeat of the interventionists in 1961, unification of the people about their leaders, growth in the strength of socialist Cuba's defenses, and development of its multilateral ties with fraternal socialist countries--all of this has persuasively demonstrated to the world that the Cuban revolution is standing firm and, in Lenin's words, that it is standing because it knows how to defend itself."*

In 1964 the RAF was outfitted with new modern military equipment. Intensive combat training proceeded everywhere. Soviet military experts tried to do everything they could to transmit their knowledge, habits and experience faster and more fully to their Cuban brothers in arms. RAF subunits and units became increasingly more organized, order became clearer, discipline grew, and military proficiency improved constantly.

In a relatively short time modern equipped training centers, training fields, firing ranges, tank driving ranges, trainers and so on were created in the units and formations. Creation of a training center at which Soviet military personnel

*Brezhnev, L. I., "Leninskim kursom" [Following Lenin's Course], Vol 4, p 404.

are now helping Cuban servicemen to master Soviet military equipment possessed by the Cuban army was truly a cause for celebration in the RAF.* Speaking about the center, Raul Castro emphasized that it was a graphical example of the truly international friendship of the Soviet and Cuban peoples and their armies.

Under the guidance of the PCC Central Committee and Comrade Fidel Castro personally, development of the armed forces continued according to plan. The main efforts were concentrated on organization in all works. Inasmuch as coordination of the activities of the troops and organization of their command and control were staff functions, special attention and concern began to be devoted to staff activity.

The year 1965 was one of further combat unification of the troops and organization of staffs as control organs for the RAF. Thoughtful and clear planning, work supervision and constant training were all at the basis of the work of all staffs, including the General Staff of Cuba's RAF.

The General Staff devoted special attention in this period to the organizational problems of the army's development, to raising the combat readiness of the troops and improving command and control, and to improving its own work. It created a well organized, smoothly running organism embracing all aspects of armed forces activities, one capable of always concentrating its efforts on solution of the most important problems without being distracted by routine.

Command-and-staff map and field exercises continued on schedule. Operational and tactical staffs learned to control the troops. Much attention was devoted to coastal defense and to learning how to combat marine and airborne assault landings. This was the basic direction of troop combat and political training, and tactical and operational-strategic training of the staffs.

Many demonstration exercises were conducted under the leadership of the minister and chief of General Staff. Raul Castro emphasized many times at exercise critiques that the theory and experience of the Soviet Army and Navy, when considered in the context of the Cuban theater of war, are the basis for training the troops and staffs, and that the knowledge and experience of Soviet military experts are of invaluable assistance to the armed forces of the Island of Freedom.

It is entirely natural that creation of a new, revolutionary army outfitted with modern military equipment demanded considerable effort in the training of regular military personnel. Such training was also complicated in Cuba by the fact that most young laborers and peasants were not sufficiently educated at that time. This is why the training of command, political and engineer-technical personnel was constantly within the field of vision of the PCC Central Committee.

To augment the courses created during the revolution, secondary and higher military schools were organized for the training of command, political and engineer personnel. Senior and top-level officers attended academies. Thus a well-organized system of regular officer training evolved. Soviet military experts worked in the military training institutions, participating directly in the training process, and they prepared Cuban officers as instructors. Concurrently the theoretical base was improved, and manuals and regulations were written and improved.

*PRAVDA, 11 September 1979.

We can say with full justification that 1966 and 1967 were years of further development of the armed forces in all directions, especially theoretical: The scientific foundation of their growth grew stronger. A scientific-theoretical conference of armed forces executives was held in the first half of 1966. Raul Castro gave a briefing. The resolutions and conclusions of this conference were laid at the basis of theoretical works, fundamental operational documents, manuals and regulations.

All armed services and branches of troops of revolutionary Cuba--ground, air and air defense, naval, and special troops and services--were created, improved, and developed. The staffs of the units and formations grew more organized. Coordination was worked out in exercises. Commanders and staffs trained in combat organization and troop command and control in complex situations. Commanders not only displayed persistence in mastering the art of war, but they also contributed many new things to the methods and forms of using armed services and branches of troops in specific conditions.

It would be difficult to list all of the remarkable commanders and chiefs who formed and taught the units and formations, and created the battleworthy army of revolutionary Cuba--the defender of the revolution's achievements, an army which could repel an enemy attack from the sea and air, and wage decisive combat on a land theater.

The Cuban people have always supported and continue to support all measures to strengthen the army, and they love it sincerely. The authority of the RAF is great, indisputable and merited. The Cubans send their best sons to the army, and they justify this trust with honor. Top-class Soviet military equipment is mastered by Cuban soldiers quickly and perfectly with the help of Soviet military experts. Cuban pilots are distinguished by honed proficiency and bravery. At all altitudes, the highest and the lowest, they proficiently execute their missions, engage in aerial training combat and support ground troops and the navy. Cuban seamen and antiaircraft troops have mastered the combat equipment well, and they display proficiency in its combat application during exercises.

In spring 1966 battle pennants were awarded to tank units. Following a solemn ceremony, Commander in Chief Fidel Castro gave a speech. He noted the great and disinterested assistance provided by the Soviet Union in strengthening Cuba's defensive might. Following this, the combat vehicles passed in solemn review before the reviewing stand, swiftly and in perfect ranks. The army of revolutionary Cuba, created with the assistance of the Soviet people, marched by. "We are invincible, our revolution can defend itself," said Fidel and Raul Castro.

The PCC Central Committee concentrated its main attention on development of the socialist economy. Tangible results were achieved in all areas. However, the sinister rumblings of the citadel of imperialism and reaction could be constantly felt. Landings of sabotage groups, shelling of plants and ports from the sea, acts of piracy against Cuban fishermen, the bombing of the country's vitally important facilities by "unknown" airplanes, and provocations by the marine base at Guantanamo were all part of a plan to keep the Cuban people from building a new, happy life, a life of socialism. The party and government, and all Cuban people, naturally had to think about constantly strengthening their state's defense capabilities.

The RAF improved in response to increasingly greater planning, and the improvement affected more and more aspects of the armed forces. The rear services of the Revolutionary Armed Forces acquired good organization. Food services and clothing for enlisted men, sergeants and officers, the storage and supply of fuel and ammunition to the troops, and other forms of rear support were well organized. Medical services were put in order. Repair of combat equipment and armament turned out to be the most important problem.

Purposeful political work was conducted systematically in the army and navy. Party organizations, which became the driving force in execution of the missions facing the troops from the very first days, were created during this period. RAF political organs working under the direct guidance of the party Central Committee did a truly titanic amount of work. Taking the oath, enlisted men and sergeants actively included themselves in combat and political training, and tried to master the equipment and its use as quickly and proficiently as possible.

Today the Revolutionary Armed Forces of the Republic of Cuba are a modern socialist army dependably standing guard over the achievements of the revolution. The Constitution of the Republic of Cuba states: "Defense of the motherland is the highest honor and the greatest duty of every Cuban."

The RAF is manned by well trained ground troops, air defense and air force troops, the Revolutionary Navy and special troops, all outfitted with modern combat equipment and armament. They possess missiles, tanks, self-propelled guns, armored transporters, artillery guns of varying caliber and purpose, modern fighter-interceptors, fighter-bombers, helicopters, antiaircraft missile complexes, frigates, antisubmarine ships, missile and torpedo boats, and so on.*

The Revolutionary Armed Forces of Cuba contain regular officers devoted to the motherland and the cause of the revolution. They are the offspring of laborers, peasants and the laboring intelligentsia. They are trained in a large number of military schools, in the General Maximo Gomez RAF Military Academy, the Naval Academy, the Military-Technical Institute, the General Antonio Maseo Combined-Arms School, and the Major Camilo Sanfuegos Artillery School. By decision of the republic's Council of Ministers all of these military training institutions were reorganized as institutions of higher education as of 7 December 1977.

During the years of popular rule, a well organized system of political organs was created in the Revolutionary Armed Forces, and they are functioning successfully today. Through them, the Central Committee of the Communist Party of Cuba guides the activities of party organizations in the army and navy, promoting indoctrination of the troops in the spirit of faithfulness to the ideals of Marxism-Leninism, love for the socialist motherland and hatred of its enemies, close unity about the Communist Party, growth of brotherhood-and-arms with the Soviet Armed Forces and the armies of other fraternal socialist countries, and solidarity with peoples fighting for their national and social liberation.

*"Sovetskaya Voyennaya Entsiklopediya" [Soviet Military Encyclopedia], Vol 4, Voenizdat, 1977, p 501.

The PCC Central Committee and personally Comrade Fidel Castro devote constant and persistent attention to strengthening party organizations in the RAF, and to strengthening their role and influence in all aspects of the life and activities of the troops.

Much significance is attached to ideological work in the Cuban RAF. Its main forms are Marxist-Leninist officer training, political lessons with sergeants and enlisted men, party education, agitation-propaganda, and mass cultural work.

Numerous exhibits at the RAF Central Palace, rooms and museums of combat glory, Lenin-Marti rooms, the clubs of the RAF units and formations, and the Playa Giron Museum describe the heroic achievements of the Cuban people.

Socialist competition plays a significant role in the struggle to achieve high results in combat and political training. It is an effective means of nurturing a conscious attitude toward military labor, encouraging performance of duty to the motherland, and developing the feelings of collectivism, mutual assistance and creative initiative.

Fraternal ties between the Soviet people and the Republic of Cuba are growing, developing and deepening with every year. The Cuban people and their glorious RAF highly value the Soviet Union's contribution to the growing defense capabilities of the Island of Freedom. This was noted specifically at the first and second PCC congresses. PCC Central Committee First Secretary Fidel Castro stated the following in his speech to the 26th CPSU Congress: "Our party's Second Congress proudly noted, in front of the whole world, that relations between the Soviet Union and Cuba are an example of fraternal friendship, based on respect. We are friends, and we will always be faithful friends of the generous and heroic people who had provided us with so much help."*

The Soviet Union's military assistance to Cuba pursues the exclusive purpose of protecting the revolutionary achievements of the Cuban people. This was emphasized by L. I. Brezhnev in his speech at a meeting of Soviet-Cuban friendship in Havana on 29 January 1974: "It is known that the Soviet Union is providing assistance to Cuba in strengthening its defenses. We are well aware--and perhaps others are aware as well--that Soviet weapons in Cuban hands are not weapons of aggression against anyone, and they are not a means for aggravating the international situation. They serve the just cause of protecting the revolutionary achievements of your country, the cause of peace and security."**

The Cuban RAF are constantly strengthening their ties and contacts with the Soviet Armed Forces. Exchange visits of military delegations having the goal of exchanging experience in organizing combat training and ideological-political indoctrination of the soldiers have become a regular occurrence. Thus for example, in fall 1979 Cuba was visited by Chief of the Main Political Directorate of the Soviet Army and Navy Army General A. A. Yepishev, and in February 1981 a friendly visit was made to Cuba

*PRAVDA, 25 February 1981.

**Brezhnev, L. I., "Leninskim kursom. Rechi i stat'i" [Following Lenin's Course. Speeches and Articles], Vol 4, p 417.

by the chief of the General Staff of the Armed Forces, USSR First Deputy Minister of Defense Marshal of the Soviet Union N. V. Ogarkov. And in 1980 the Soviet Union was visited by a delegation from the Cuban RAF headed by the chief of the Central Political Directorate, Division General S. B. Santana.* Friendly visits by Soviet warships to ports of the Republic of Cuba make an important contribution to strengthening cooperation between Soviet and Cuban soldiers.

A number of troop exercises were conducted in recent years: "Ayacugo-150", "The First Congress" and "Second Anniversary of the RAF". Ground troops, air defense and air force troops and the Revolutionary Navy took part in them. They demonstrated the greater coordination and high level of field, aerial, and naval training of armed forces personnel. Military delegations from fraternal socialist countries, including a delegation from the USSR Armed Forces, were present at the exercises. The ties of the Cuban RAF with armies of other socialist countries are growing stronger and developing with every year, promoting reinforcement of the defense capabilities of states in the socialist fraternity.

The years that have passed since the Cuban revolution have been a time of persistent, truly heroic struggle and labor of the Cuban people under the guidance of their tested and seasoned vanguard--the Communist Party--for the country's socialist transformation. In this creative activity, the Cuban people constantly sense the strong hand of fraternal assistance from the USSR and states of the socialist fraternity.

*KRASNAYA ZVEZDA, 29 August 1980.

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HISTORICAL DATA ON AVIATION OF THE BLACK SEA FLEET

Moscow VOYENNO-ISTORICHESKIY ZHURNAL, in Russian No 4, Apr 81 (signed to press 20 Feb 81) pp 71-73

[Article, published under the heading "Scientific Reports and Information," by Commander of Aviation of the Red Banner Black Sea Fleet Col Gen Avn V. Voronov, Merited Military Pilot of the USSR: "Always in Combat Readiness"]

[Text] The staff of the air fleet of the Black and Azov seas began functioning on 3 March 1921. This date is said to be the birthday of Black Sea Fleet aviation. On 1 January 1922 its composition included one fighter and two reconnaissance sea-plane detachments equipped with 20 obsolete airplanes.

In 1926, on order of the republic's Revvoyensovet [Revolutionary Military Council], the first marine minelaying squadron was formed on the Black Sea, and in April of the same year the first ship-borne flight was formed aboard the cruiser "Chervon Ukraina".

Black Sea pilots demonstrated their improved skills in Moscow at an air parade on the event of the celebrations of the 10th anniversary of Great October. In the sky above the capital, the Black Sea pilots displayed outstanding group cohesiveness and virtuous piloting techniques, for which they were rewarded by the Peoples Commissar for Military and Naval Affairs, Revvoyensovet Chairman K. Ye. Voroshilov.

On 30 April 1934 former Black Sea pilots S. A. Levanevskiy, A. V. Lyapidevskiy, V. S. Molokov and I. V. Doronin were among the first to earn the lofty title of Hero of the Soviet Union for rescuing the passengers and crew of the steamship "Chelyuskin".

In the 1930's the organization of aviation was improved in connection with growing complexity of its air missions. All Black Sea Fleet air squadrons were combined into two air brigades. Formation of the first air regiments began in 1937-1938. Additional steps were taken to reorganize control of the Black Sea Fleet air forces and their rear services.

There were 625 airplanes of various types in Black Sea fleet aviation by the beginning of the Great Patriotic War.*

*"Sovetskaya Voyennaya Entsiklopediya" [Soviet Military Encyclopedia], Vol 8, Voenizdat, 1980, p 459.

The acts of heroism committed by airmen of the Black Sea Fleet air forces are inscribed in gold letters in the chronicle of the past war. During the defense of Odessa and Sevastopol', in the battles of the Crimea and the Caucasus, during the liberation of the Ukraine, Romania and Bulgaria, in close coordination with surface ships, submarines and frontal aviation, the pilots flew devastating strikes against naval bases and airfields, and against land forces and the most important military-economic objectives, they disrupted the enemy's marine shipping, and they engaged in aerial combat. During the Great Patriotic War the Black Sea hawks committed 18 aerial rams, with Ya. Ivanov and M. Borisov ramming enemy craft twice.

In all during the war, the Black Sea Fleet air forces were credited with 131,637 combat sorties. They annihilated 50,000 enemy enlisted men and officers, and a large quantity of military transporters, auxiliary vessels, tanks and other military equipment. Orders and medals were awarded to 10,639 persons for exemplary fulfillment of combat assignments and the bravery displayed in their execution, while 61 pilots and navigators were awarded the lofty title of Hero of the Soviet Union.* One division and five regiments were reorganized as Guards units. Many formations and units were awarded orders, and they were named after cities, in the liberation of which they had distinguished themselves.

The successes in development of the economy, science and technology achieved by the Soviet people under the guidance of the Communist Party in the postwar era made it possible to create a powerful, qualitatively new material-technical base from which to outfit the army and navy, to include the air forces of the Black Sea Fleet. The period of assimilation of jet aircraft was an important phase in the history of the Black Sea Fleet air forces. The first pilots to fly YaK-17's and MIG-15's in June 1950 belonged to a Guards fighter regiment--V. Logunov, N. Spesivov and S. Surzhenko.** In 1951, in maximally short time, the MIG-15 was mastered by all pilots in fighter aviation of the Black Sea Fleet. Concurrently pilots of reconnaissance and mine-torpedo launching aviation mastered the new IL-28 and TU-14 jet airplanes. By as early as July 1951 15 Black Sea Fleet crews participated in an air parade in Moscow aboard TU-14 torpedo carriers, and they earned the high praise of the government.

The first missile was launched in the Black Sea Fleet from a TU-14 in December 1953 by a crew under Major A. Kazakov's command. The pilots and navigators of missile aviation won missile launching competitions for the prize of the naval commander in chief many times. Such launchings were a good way to improve combat proficiency. Many airmen learned to hit their targets with the first strike in the most difficult conditions.

The birth and development of antisubmarine and deck aviation make up a special page in the history of the fleet's air forces. In the 1950's antisubmarine air units received MI-14 and KA-15 helicopters, and BYe-6 seaplanes. In December 1952 a helicopter crew commanded by Senior Lieutenant V. G. Savrasov, based aboard the battleship "Sevastopol'", successfully completed their antisubmarine missions in Black Sea Fleet exercises. In 1961 the crew of a jet seaplane consisting of officers N. Andriyevskiy, A. Bezverkhnyy and G. Fedorenko set a world speed record.

*Ivanov, L. N., "Kryl'ya nad morem" [Wings Above the Sea], Voenizdat, 1972, pp 212, 213.

**The author of this article was in this group as well.--Editor.

A qualitatively new stage in the development of antisubmarine aviation was initiated by the appearance of the antisubmarine cruisers "Moskva" and "Leningrad" in the Black Sea Fleet. In daily combat training, on cruises, and in sorties, carrier helicopter pilots learned not only to find "enemy" submarines on their own, but also to pursue them over a long period of time.

Carrier helicopter pilots participated in the first lengthy ocean cruise in the late 1960's. In extremely complex conditions, in the face of real countermeasures by a simulated enemy, the Black Sea pilots successfully completed their important missions, displaying courage and valor. Since that time Black Sea Fleet aviation began regularly participating in lengthy voyages aboard ships.

In April-May 1970 carrier helicopter pilots took an active part in the USSR Navy "Okean" maneuvers aboard the antisubmarine cruisers "Moskva" and "Leningrad", and successfully completed their missions.

The selfless work of Black Sea airmen to remove the mines from the Gulf of Suez (1974), performed at the request of our government, was an example of whole-hearted service to the cause of socialism and fulfillment of international duty.

Black Sea aviation also played a great role in the mastery of vertical take-off carrier aircraft. The pioneers in this important effort were pilots F. Matkovskiy, G. Kovalev, Yu. Ratnenko and others. Owing to their selfless labor, the present generation of naval pilots is successfully performing its difficult service aboard ships on the expanses of the World Ocean today.

A major contribution to development of Black Sea aviation and to indoctrination of courageous and bold aerial warriors was made by generals A. A. Mironenko, B. A. Novikov, B. A. Pochikovskiy, I. S. Sergeyev, A. P. Shipov, A. P. Galichiy, I. G. Yaramyshev, P. A. Meshchaninov and A. Ya. Tarasenko, and officers I. M. Voytsitskiy, F. I. Zolotar' and A. F. Sutulov.

Party-political work had an important place in fulfillment of the complex, important missions facing the units in the postwar era. Implementing decisions of party congresses and CPSU Central Committee plenums, the commanders, political organs, and party and Komsomol organizations unified the military collectives, mobilized the personnel for success in combat and political training, and nurtured Communist convictions, ideological steadfastness, alertness, and constant readiness to defend the motherland and the achievements of socialism in the airmen. Generals and officers I. I. Serbin, P. A. Sabadyr', I. I. Uryadov, A. V. Khramtsov and A. I. Kokarev proved themselves to be competent organizers of party-political work.

The postwar years persuasively confirmed that the baton of combat glory is in reliable hands. Awards for military labor in days of peace were added to the awards earned by units in the years of war. Twenty-one Black Sea airmen were awarded the honorary titles "Merited Military Pilot of the USSR" and "Merited Military Navigator of the USSR" for special merits in mastering aviation equipment, for attaining high indicators in the training and indoctrination of flying personnel, and for many years of selfless flight work. Just during the 10th Five-Year Plan alone more than 350 officers and warrant officers of the Black Sea Fleet air forces were awarded orders and medals of the Soviet Union.

Fulfilling the decisions of the 26th CPSU Congress, the airmen are constantly raising their combat readiness. Today the cream of the crop is represented by airmen of units and subunits led by commanders and political workers officers Yu. I. Lazarev, Yu. S. Sayenko, I. G. Tunik, V. A. Borzunov, A. K. Tsikalov and G. I. Golubev.

Closely united about the Leninist party and wholly devoted to their people, the airmen are serving alertly within the composition of the Red Banner Black Sea Fleet.

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TRADE UNION ROLE IN MILITARY PATRIOTIC WORK DESCRIBED

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[Article, published under the heading "Scientific Reports and Information," by Maj (Res) R. Akchurin, and Member of the Scientific Methods Council for Propaganda of Military Knowledge of the All-Union "Znaniye" Society, Docent, Candidate of Juridical Sciences Maj (Res) A. Bychkov: "Participation of Trade Unions in Military-Patriotic and Mass Defense Work"]

[Text] The trade unions, which have a membership of about 130 million persons, play a great role in military-patriotic and civil defense work. Under the guidance of the Communist Party and in close interaction with state and public organizations and the military commissariats, they are doing everything they can to assist in the indoctrination of Soviet citizens in the spirit of selfless devotion to the CPSU and the socialist motherland, patriotism and proletarian internationalism. They are encouraging young people to study the fundamentals of military affairs, and they are making an effort to improve their physical fitness and ensure that the young generation would be able to rise to the defense of the fatherland and the whole socialist fraternity with weapons in hand at any moment.

Military-patriotic indoctrination of the laborers is one of the most important tasks of the CPSU, the Soviet state and the entire political system.¹

At the eve of the 26th CPSU Congress the trade unions, as well as other public organizations, did a great deal of work among their members to study and discuss the decisions of the October (1980) CPSU Central Committee Plenum, the speeches given at it by CPSU Central Committee General Secretary, Chairman of the Presidium of the USSR Supreme Soviet, Comrade L. I. Brezhnev, and the CPSU Central Committee draft report "Basic Directions of the USSR's Economic and Social Development in 1981-1985 and in the Period to 1990". The political enthusiasm and labor of the masses were guided by trade union organizations toward successful fulfillment of the plans and pledges adopted in honor of the congress. The pregress socialist competition, which assumed broad scope, promoted patriotic indoctrination of the laborers.

Noting the greater role of the trade unions in the life of Soviet society, Comrade Brezhnev said at the 26th CPSU Congress: "The party views the trade unions as its reliable support in the masses...."la

The ideological-theoretical basis of military-patriotic and civil defense work conducted by the trade unions consists of Lenin's teaching on protection of the socialist fatherland and Vladimir Il'ich's indication of the need for implementing measures "which should be carried out both by party organizations and especially by trade unions to encourage larger masses of the working class to actively participate in the country's defense."²

In their military-patriotic and civil defense work, and under the guidance of the CPSU, the trade unions are cooperating with the soviets of people's deputies, ministries and departments, the Komsomol, DOSAAF, the All-Union "Znaniye" Society, sports organizations and the Soviet War Veterans Committee. The trade unions also maintain close ties with military units and military commissariats. Together with the Komsomol Central Committee and the USSR DOSAAF Central Committee, the AUCCTU adopted a number of important resolutions, including "On Measures to Reinforce Military-Patriotic Indoctrination of the Public", dated 15 July 1966. In compliance with this document, together with the Komsomol Central Committee the AUCCTU and the DOSAAF Central Committee organized and are now conducting an all-union socialist competition aimed at improving the organization of military-patriotic and civil defense work. Each year the winners of the competition are given Red Banners, diplomas, cups and money prizes.

Guiding themselves by the CPSU Central Committee decree "On Further Improvement of Ideological and Political Indoctrination", party, trade union and other public organizations are attaching increasingly greater significance to integrated military-patriotic indoctrination, and to coordination of their efforts.

Instructive experience has been accumulated in Belorussia. Here, in one of the plenums of the republic's party Central Committee, an integrated plan for communist and patriotic indoctrination of young people was examined and approved. It is now being successfully implemented.³ In Minsk for example, a unified system of planning and managing ideological indoctrination and military-patriotic work is operating effectively. City and rayon coordination councils have been organized. Under the guidance of the party organizations they are coordinating their efforts with soviet, trade union and Komsomol organs, and economic, cultural and educational organizations. Special attention is being devoted to work in residential areas. The party organizations of enterprises and institutions have formed commissions at housing administration offices, sponsoring lectures, clubs, and seminars on communist indoctrination, museums of the people's glory, circles, and sports sections. The activities of public organizations of the Minsk Tractor Plant deserve attention. On the initiative of the plant's "Syn Rodiny" Military-Patriotic Club, the Palace of Culture organizes about 30 discussion evenings each year. Young workers, war and labor veterans, senior students of subsidized schools, and Soviet Army soldiers are invited to these discussions.

Organizations of Primorskiy Kray are doing a substantial amount of work in military-patriotic indoctrination of the public. Each year the party kray, city and rayon committees organize Revolutionary Glory Week (from 25 October to 7 November) throughout the kray, as well as meetings of war and labor veterans with young people and soldiers, and lectures and reports on military-patriotic topics. The kray has numerous museums, rooms and nooks of combat and labor glory, schools of young defenders of the motherland, the "Varyag" Pioneer Flotilla, the "Yunga", "Za Otchiznu", and "Yunyy Drug Morskoy Pekhoty" naval clubs, and other organizations.

In recent years new all-union patriotic clubs have opened in many cities, and they are now working actively. They include, in particular, "Malaya zemlya" in Novorossiysk, "Prometey" in Dnepropetrovsk and "Pervotselinnik" in Alma-Ata.⁴

Useful experience has been accumulated in Bryanskaya Oblast. In 1978, at a joint plenum of the oblast trade union council and the oblast committees of the Komsomol and DOSAAF, a 3-year plan aimed at improving work with young people in this area was approved. In the last 2 years 76 universities and clubs of the future soldier, 800 military-patriotic associations, more than 1,700 technical circles, and defense-sports health camps have been founded in the oblast. They have a total membership of 65,000 young people. Cooperation between the trade union and DOSAAF committees of the Bryansk Road Machine Building Plant imeni 50-Letiye Velikogo Oktyabrya has been organized successfully (plant trade union committee chairman A. Kondrashov, DOSAAF Committee chairman Ye. Kochev).⁵ Problems associated with military-patriotic indoctrination are reflected in the collective contracts of this plant. Each year its laborers adopt pledges associated with civil defense work, and the plant committee finances the work and provides the organizers. A commission for military-patriotic indoctrination is functioning at the plant. Triumphant send-offs for draftees called up for active service, discussion evenings, civil defense months and weeks, trips to places of glory of the Soviet people and public patriotic holidays are organized through the combined efforts of the trade union and DOSAAF organizations. Active trade union and DOSAAF members jointly organize and conduct lessons in the university of the future soldier and the plant museum of labor and combat glory, and they sponsor film lectures. Problems associated with civil defense work are examined at joint meetings of the plant trade union and DOSAAF committees. New sports sections and DOSAAF nooks have been created in the shops, and the number of persons interested in military-patriotic measures has risen. All sorts of equipment has been placed at the disposal of DOSAAF members through the assistance and with the support of the plant committee--three motor vehicles, 20 motorcycles, 15 scooters and motorboats, go-carts and infantry weapons. Dozens of active trade union members have become directors of sports sections and trainers, they are conducting trips to places of combat glory, and they are leading technical circles. Competent organizers of military-patriotic and civil defense work include the brothers Anatoliy and Gennadiy Nosov, Master of Sports Yu. Yelagin, trade union and DOSAAF veteran I. Chalov, engineer A. Brusentsov, fitter Ye. Petrov, electrician I. Medvedkov and many others.

War and labor veterans as well as army and navy officers retired from the U.S. Armed Forces into the reserves, and military commissariat workers are actively participating in military-patriotic and civil defense work. They generously share their rich life experience with the young. Thus in Ul'yanovsk, more than 80 percent of the working war veterans are shock workers of communist labor. Included among them is a former scout V. Zolinov, who was awarded the Hero of Socialist Labor title for his outstanding successes in fulfillment of the national economic plan. Former frontliner S. Derabin has an Order of the Red Labor Banner and an Order of the October Revolution on his chest. These people and other friends of theirs often speak to the young people about the heroism of the Soviet people on the battlefields of the war, and about the acts of labor heroism being committed by the builders of communism today. In Tbilisi, laborers of the "Tbilitabak" Production Association show great interest in the recollections of V. Zarelu and Sh. Tatarashvili, participants of the battle of Novorossiysk, as described in L. I. Brezhnev's book

"The Little Land". Laborers have also heard the stories of E. Gonashvili, A. Bokuchav, G. Levashev, G. Dzhiashvili and others. Retired Soviet Army servicemen I. Lutchenko, S. Tatsi, M. Papidze, M. Ioramishvili, Ts. Saakava and others are providing great assistance in basic military training lessons for conscripts.⁷ They transfer the baton of faithfulness to the combat traditions of the Soviet Armed Forces to the future soldiers.

Indoctrination of the Soviet people in the spirit of selfless devotion to the cause of the party and to communist ideals, and of love for the socialist fatherland and proletarian internationalism had been and continues to be the core of military-patriotic indoctrination of laborers. All of this work became especially more active in connection with national commemoration of remarkable events and dates such as the 30th anniversary of the victory in the Great Patriotic War, the 60th anniversary of Great October, the adoption of the new USSR Constitution, the 60th anniversary of the Soviet Armed Forces and the 35th anniversary of the victory in the Great Patriotic War. Thus during the days of celebration of the 35th anniversary of the Great Victory mass all-union meetings were held between war veterans and young people. About 1.5 million young men and women participated in these meetings.⁸ In November 1980 a Revolutionary Glory Week was held with the participation of the trade unions. During it, solemn parades were conducted to monuments and obelisks erected in memory of heroes of the revolution, where flowers and garlands were laid. There were also revolutionary and political song festivals, conferences, exhibitions and other functions. The USSR DOSAAF Central Committee Plenum held in November 1980, which was attended by Chief of the Soviet Army and Navy Political Directorate Army General A. A. Yepishev, AUCCTU Secretary B. F. Bogatikov, and officials of party, trade union and Komsomol organizations, and of ministries and departments, obligated the defense society's committees to concentrate their efforts on raising the level of ideological work and indoctrination in the organizations, in order that ideological convictions would be formed more actively in the Soviet people, and so that their constant readiness to defend the motherland could be raised.⁹

In order to mobilize the laborers and young people for a worthy greeting to the 26th CPSU Congress, to further improve their indoctrination in the heroic traditions of the USSR Armed Forces and to improve military-patriotic and civil defense work among the public, the AUCCTU Secretariat, the Komsomol Central Committee Secretariat and the Bureau of the Presidium of the DOSAAF Central Committee adopted a decree establishing the All-Union Civil Defense Work Month from 23 January to 23 February 1981, under the slogan "A Worthy Greeting for the 26th CPSU Congress!". DOSAAF members, war veterans, leading laborers, and army and navy soldiers took part in it. During the month there were numerous competitions in technical and applied military forms of sports, and there were car, motorcycle and ski agitation runs. Many laborers, college students and schoolchildren visited military units and ships, where they acquainted themselves with combat equipment, weapons, and the life and training of soldiers. Various military-patriotic and civil defense functions were conducted extensively throughout the country. The trade unions are now participating in the all-union march of Komsomol members and young people to places of the revolutionary, combat and labor glory of the Soviet people; 60 million young men and women have been encouraged to attend this function.¹⁰

Thus in September 1980 the trade union organizations participated in the Ninth All-Union Rally of Participants of the All-Union Campaign of Komsomol Members and

Young People to Places of the Revolutionary, Combat and Labor Glory of the Soviet People. This mass patriotic movement now has a history of 15 years. It is proceeding on the basis of a resolution of the AUCCTU Secretariat, the Komsomol Central Committee Secretariat, the Governing Board of the USSR Ministry of Culture, the Presidium of the DOSAAF Central Committee, and the Presidium of the Soviet War Veterans Committee, with the participation of the Central Council for Tourism and Excursions and the All-Union Council of Trade Union Voluntary Sports Societies. The meticulous search by participants of the march has helped to establish the names of 350,000 soldiers and partisans who had fallen in battles against the Germans. Thirty-four thousand obelisks and memorials have been erected on battlefields in memory of heroes of the Great Patriotic War, and 140,000 museums and rooms of combat and labor glory have been established in plants and factories, in military units, and at educational institutions.¹¹

The trade unions and DOSAAF collectives are playing an important role in organizing basic military training for young people at training centers created by the administration at enterprises and in schools, tekhnikums and vocational-technical schools. As an example a center at the Khar'kov Turbine Plant, where young people undergo general military and military-technical training and master the habits of protecting themselves against mass destruction weapons, is functioning successfully. Its material base was created by the plant board on the initiative of the party committee, and with the active participation of the plant trade union and DOSAAF committees. The enterprise's public workers have built visual aids and mock-ups for the military classroom, and they have set up a weapon storage room. Physical education and sports are an inherent part of military-patriotic and civil defense work. There are more than 39 million members in 33 trade union voluntary sports societies. They have almost 3,000 stadiums, 11,000 gymnasiums, 5,000 ski areas, 800 swimming pools and other sports facilities at their disposal.¹² The trade union voluntary sports societies are conducting mass competitions, including in applied military forms of sports, and they are training GTO [ready for labor and defense of the USSR] badge-holders. Their wards are participating in country, Europe, and world championships. As an example just in the first two stages of the Seventh Summer Spartacade of the Peoples of the USSR, which preceded the 22d Olympics, more than 43 million athletes representing 119,000 collectives participated; of these, 25 million persons had completed the GTO norms, 24.5 million received sports ranks, and 11,768 became masters of sports.¹³ Many trade union sportsmen successfully participated in the 22d Olympics in Moscow. Applied military forms of sports are enjoying further development from one year to the next. Athletes and sportsmen are being indoctrinated in the spirit of high labor and political activity, and constant readiness to defend the motherland.

Each year more than 1 billion rubles are allocated from the country's trade union budget to support educational, mass cultural, athletic and sports work among the laborers and their families.¹⁴

The trade unions participate in development of military-technical forms of sports. In compliance with the resolution of the AUCCTU Secretariat and Bureau of the Presidium of the USSR DOSAAF Central Committee, "On Further Development of Technical and Applied Forms of Sports" dated 30 November 1978, the voluntary sports societies of the trade unions and the DOSAAF organizations have begun developing rifle, motor vehicle, motorcycle, motorboat, underwater and other forms of sports more actively.

More than 3. million persons have been encouraged to participate regularly in them. More than 250 technical-sports clubs (STK's) and about 100 specialized children's and young people's technical-sports schools are operating within the DOSAAF system in cooperation with trade unions and their organizations. More than 50 million persons participated in the Seventh Summer Spartacade of the Peoples of the USSR in technical and applied military forms of sports.¹⁵

All-union joint trade union and Komsomol cross-country foot races are held each year. Thus in fall 1980 the competitions in Khar'kov were attended by cross-country runners representing the best athletic collectives of enterprises, construction projects, higher and secondary educational institutions, kolkhozes and sovkhoses. These people competed for awards provided by the Komsomol Central Committee and the All-Union Council of Trade Union Voluntary Sports Society. Cross-country ski races are held regularly as well. The winter joint trade union and Komsomol cross-country ski race of 1979 had a participation of 15 million persons, while the 1980 races were attended by 15.3 million persons.¹⁶

Young people who get their training in technical-sports clubs and sections, in athletic collectives, and at defense-sports camps subsequently master military specialties in the armed forces successfully.

A national competitive review for best organization of mass athletic and sports work in residential areas, sponsored by the USSR Sports Committee, the AUCCTU, the Komsomol Central Committee, the USSR DOSAAF Central Committee, and the editorial board of the newspaper IZVESTIYA, is promoting greater activity in the work of republic, kray and oblast athletic organizations. In the last 3 years several million more persons have been encouraged to participate in physical education regularly. More than 8,000 athletic-sports clubs have been created, 30,000 health sections and groups have been organized, and about 60,000 athletic fields have been built in residential microdistricts. Trade union organizations and their voluntary sports society clubs and teams have been allocated athletic equipment worth 4 million rubles. The trade union sports societies "Spartak", "Krasnoye Znamya", "Kalev" and "Zhal'giris" and the "Dinamo" Departmental Sports Society are providing tremendous assistance to communal housing organizations.¹⁷

Local trade union organizations are participating actively with representatives of military units and military commissariats in the preparation and conduct of annual "Zarnitsa" and "Orlenok" games. Presently more than 24 million Pioneers, school-children, and students of vocational-technical schools and tekhnikum are learning the basics of military affairs in the Pioneer "Zarnitsa" and Komsomol "Orlenok" games.¹⁸ The Fourth All-Union "Orlenok" Military-Sports Games, dedicated to the 35th anniversary of the victory, were conducted in August 1980. Organized by the Komsomol Central Committee, the Ministry of Education, the Ministry of Higher and Secondary Special Education, the USSR State Committee for Vocational and Technical Education, the USSR Committee for Sports and the USSR DOSAAF Central Committee with the participation of local trade union organizations, the military-sports youth games were conducted in the industrial center of the Urals, the city of Sverdlovsk, which possesses a heritage of rich revolutionary, labor and combat traditions. Participants of the military-sports relay race "Ready to Defend the Motherland!" visited the legendary "Uralmash", met with war and labor veterans, visited with students in some military schools, and acquainted themselves with the life and personal experiences of the personnel of a certain military unit.

The ideological-political orientation of tourist and excursion functions has grown significantly in recent years. Today, tourists and excursion participants can now choose from 11,000 different itineraries; more than 1,350 trips concerned with the heroic history of the CPSU, the life and activities of "I. Lenin and his colleagues, and our contemporaries who are carrying on the commandments of the leader have been developed.¹⁹

The tasks associated with improving tourism and excursions were defined in a decree adopted in late 1980 by the CPSU Central Committee, the USSR Council of Ministers and the AUCCTU: "On Further Development and Improvement of Tourist and Excursion Affairs in the Country". It obligates us to intensify control over the ideological content of tourist and excursion work, to devote more attention to the selection, placement and ideological-political indoctrination of the employees of tourist-excursion institutions, and promote creation of an atmosphere of high exactingness and responsibility in these institutions.

Socialist competition is an effective means for indoctrinating young people in the spirit of patriotism. It promotes growth in responsibility for development of communism and defense of the motherland, indoctrination in the spirit of collectivism, and development of an active life position. This form of work is being used extensively to prepare for revolutionary holidays and celebrations associated with noteworthy dates and historical events.

Defense of the socialist fatherland is everyone's business. Therefore it is quite natural that the role and responsibility of each labor collective in organizing and improving military-patriotic and civil defense work have been enlarged. But concurrently there are shortcomings in this important work as well. All is not well with the organization of defense-sports health camps. They frequently operate in accordance with different plans and the length of the encampments vary, even though the work and the material support to be provided to the camps were spelled out by a decree of the AUCCTU, the Komsomol Central Committee, the USSR Sports Committee and the USSR DOSAAF Central Committee back in 1974. We also need to improve local military sponsorship, which is sometimes limited to exchange of delegations and performance of sporadic functions. In many places competition between sponsoring and sponsored collectives is still weak, and few joint prizes for young enterprise laborers and army and navy soldiers for achievements in labor, combat and political training are being instituted. Development of tourism and excursions is still behind the growing demand of the Soviet people. Military-patriotic work has a need for closer ties and for coordination of the efforts of state, business and public organizations, ministries and departments. This is a task of state importance, and it must be at the center of attention constantly. If the educational work of the trade unions is to penetrate deeply and if its quality is to grow, we must make more effective use of worker and trade union meetings, people's universities and schools of communist labor, and meetings of laborers with trade union and business executives, production innovators and competition initiators.

"...our trade unions," said Comrade L. I. Brezhnev at the 26th CPSU Congress, "sometimes do not show enough initiative in exercising their extensive rights."^{19a}

Further reinforcement of combat cooperation among soldiers of the fraternal socialist countries, and cooperation and exchange of experience by public organizations in this area have important significance to improving military-patriotic work.

In the present historical conditions, at a time when imperialists and their Beijing accomplices are doing everything they can to aggravate the international situation and force the arms race, spending incredible sums for this purpose, and to create powder kegs in different regions of the globe, peace-loving forces must be especially alert. The Soviet Union and the entire socialist fraternity are doing everything they can to prevent nuclear catastrophe, and they are displaying constant concern for maintaining their military potential at the required level. Military-patriotic and civil defense work conducted under party guidance by Soviet trade unions jointly with other public organizations and military commissariats is promoting further reinforcement of our state's defense capabilities and growth in the combat readiness of its armed forces. This was emphasized in the greeting of the CPSU Central Committee to the 16th Congress of Trade Unions, which stated that "Soviet trade unions are the reliable support of our Leninist party in all of its work aimed at developing the labor and political activity of the masses and mobilizing their creative efforts for reinforcement of our motherland's economic and defensive might...."²⁰

FOOTNOTES

1. For greater detail see Drugov, V., "Military-Patriotic Indoctrination of Laborers--One of the Most Important Tasks of Modern Times," VOYENNO-ISTORICHESKIY ZHURNAL, No 9, 1979, pp 3-8.
- 1a. PRAVDA, 24 February 1981.
2. Lenin, V. I., "Poln. sobr. soch." [Complete Collected Works], Vol 38, p 271.
3. See IZVESTIYA, 25 November 1980.
4. KRASNAYA ZVEZDA, 14 September 1980.
5. See SOVETSKIY PATRIOT, 14 September 1980.
7. See SOVETSKIY PATRIOT, 27 February 1980.
8. See PARTIYNAYA ZHIZN', No 1, 1981, p 31.
9. See TRUD, 21 November 1980; IZVESTIYA, 20 January 1981.
10. See IZVESTIYA, 25 November 1980.
11. See IZVESTIYA, 4 September 1980.
12. See TRUD, 9 August 1980.

13. See TRUD, 26 August 1979.
14. PRAVDA, 28 December 1980.
15. See IZVESTIYA, 20 January 1981.
16. See TRUD, 24 January 1981.
17. See IZVESTIYA, 8 December 1980.
18. See KOMMUNIST, No 18, 1978, p 36.
19. PRAVDA, 25 February 1980.
- 19a. PRAVDA, 24 February 1981.
20. "Materialy XVI s"yezda professional'nykh soyuzov SSSR" [Proceedings of the 16th Congress of USSR Trade Unions], Moscow, Profizdat, 1977, p 4.

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BOOK REVIEW: GERMAN OCCUPATION POLICIES IN WW II

Moscow VOYENNO-ISTORICHESKIY ZHURNAL in Russian No 4, Apr 81(signed to press 20 Feb 81)pp 88-89

[Book Review by Candidate of Historical Sciences Col (Res) I. Shinkarev: "Book on Fascist German Occupation Methods"]

[Text] National enslavement of the peoples of occupied countries is one of the aspects of fascist German occupation policy that has been subjected to little study in the historical literature. It is to this issue that a book authored by professor, Doctor of Historical Sciences M. I. Semiryaga and published by the "Nauka" Publishing House is devoted.*

Preparing for World War II, German fascism sought allies not only among states with ruling circles having some sort of territorial claims upon their neighbors. The Germans also tried to capitalize on Slovak and Flemish bourgeois autonomy and Croatia reactionary separatism, and it made broad use of nationalistic prejudices of the petty bourgeois masses, and all cracks in international relations in Europe, in order to expand such cracks and beat wedges in between nations.

The author of the book reveals the essence of the nationalities issue in occupied Europe of World War II, noting: "This was an intricate complex of political, economic, cultural, legal and other mutual relations between the fascist invaders and the nations they enslaved.... The struggle for national and state sovereignty was, during World War II as well as in the previous era, one of the forms of the general democratic movement" (p 11). He emphasizes the idea that the policy of national oppression implemented by the fascist German invaders was directly associated with the class policy of German monopolies. In this connection M. I. Semiryaga cites Lenin's statement that the international policy of financial capital, in generating imperialist wars, was simultaneously "unavoidably generating unprecedented growth of national oppression, plunder, robbery, and suffocation of weak, backward and small nationalities by a small group of 'leading' powers..." (p 12).

The book is valuable in that the author analyzes the content and methods of the fascist German policy of national oppression on the basis of documents of the CPSU and of other communist and workers' parties, documents having the important objective of unmasking and uprooting neofascism and racism today.

*Semiryaga, M. I., "Nemetsko-fashistskaya politika natsional'nogo poraboshcheniya v okkupirovannykh stranakh Zapadnoy i Severnoy Yevropy" [The Fascist German Policy of National Enslavement in Occupied Countries of West and North Europe], Moscow, "Nauka", 1980, 240 pp.

In chapters devoted to the occupation regime in France, Belgium, Norway and other countries of West and North Europe, the reader finds extensive facts revealing the structure of occupation organs and their function and role in economic plunder of these states, in annihilation of national culture, and in acts of terror and violence against the people. Thus one unique feature of the fascist German occupation of Denmark was that both countries were not formally in a state of war between each other. Relations between Berlin and Copenhagen were maintained not through special occupation organs but rather through conventional diplomatic channels, since the Danish social-democratic government, which remained "loyal" to the occupation powers, provided the latter no grounds for any sort of decisive repressive measures (p 25).

The occupation policy of the Germans was more cruel in France. The imperialist contradictions between Germany and France were referred to by Hitler as a "perpetual conflict", one which could be resolved only by Germany's military victory over France.

The book unmasks the treacherous role of the collaborationists. Without their services and aid, the invaders would have experienced serious difficulties in implementing their policy of plunder in the occupied countries.

One of the main elements of the fascist policy of national oppression of occupied peoples was annihilation and plunder of their cultural valuables. In the Netherlands for example, Hitler's special emissaries--Goering and Rosenberg--"bought up" works of art at reduced prices (p 74). In France, meanwhile, they openly stole them. Goering personally took objects of value from the French to enlarge his own collection (p 156).

A significant part of the book is devoted to revealing the fascist German forms and methods of national oppression. Splitting nationalities and national groups was the main principle of inflaming international enmity. For their insidious purposes, the Germans offered some nationalities certain privileges. They made extensive use of the method of compulsory Germanization--that is, repatriation of millions of persons from different countries into Germany for the purposes of heavy and harmful work in industry and in agriculture, believing that this would lead to the inevitable death of a number of nations, even though outwardly this act would not seem to have ill-effects.

But the main lever in the occupation policy of the fascists was violence and physical annihilation of entire nationalities believed to be "inferior". For this purpose they built more than 10,500 concentration camps intended for different purposes, where more than 11 million persons were tortured (pp 226-227). All of this could not but elicit the opposition of the enslaved peoples. This opposition expressed itself as the Resistance Movement against the oppressors in Denmark, Norway, Belgium, Italy and France. Communists, who suffered the highest losses, marched in the vanguard of this struggle.

It should be noted in conclusion that the book would have been of even greater benefit, had the author discussed the role of Wehrmacht organs in implementation of occupation policy in greater detail, to include their contribution to terrorism, economic plunder and annihilation of the cultural valuables of the occupied states.

The discussion of the struggle of liberation waged in some of the region's occupied countries is extremely meager. Given the great diversity of sources, the author failed to utilize material contained in published court records of the trials of Germans and local quislings after the war in a number of countries.

M. I. Semiryaga's monograph will make a certain contribution to unmasking the misanthropic nature of German fascism. It will encourage alertness against the intrigues of modern neofascism and racism.

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